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ABSTRACT—A recent spate of election laws tightened registration rules, 
reduced convenient voting opportunities, and required voters to show 
specific types of identification in order to vote. Because these laws make 
voting more difficult, critics have analogized them to Jim Crow Era voter 
suppression laws. 
We challenge the analogy that current restrictive voting laws are a 
reincarnation of Jim Crow Era voter suppression. While there are some 
notable similarities, the analogy obscures a more apt comparison to a 
different form of voter suppression—one that operates to effectively 
disfranchise an entire class of people, just as the old form did for African 
Americans. This form of suppression excludes the poor. 
To account for the effective disfranchisement of the poor, we develop 
a more robust theory of voting than currently exists in the legal literature. 
Drawing on rational choice and sociological theories of voting, we show how 
information, affiliation with formal organizations, and integration into social 
networks of politically active individuals are far more important to the 
decision to vote than the tangible costs of voting associated with the new 
voter suppression. 
Using this expanded account of voting, we identify the role of political 
parties and their mobilization activities in the effective disfranchisement of 
the poor. Relying on the same proprietary data as the Obama campaign in 
2008 and 2012 (and hundreds of campaigns since), along with other public 
sources of data, we show how campaigns employ a “calculus of contact” to 
decide whom to mobilize. That calculus leads campaigns to 
disproportionately neglect the poor when canvassing, calling, and sending 
political mailers to potential voters—mobilization activities that have a 
sizeable turnout effect. In our view, the most significant voter suppression 
tactics of the twenty-first century are therefore not what legislatures are 
doing, but what campaigns are not doing. 
We argue that a first step in combating this passive voter suppression 
should involve changing the information environment of campaigns: the 
amount and type of information about potential voters that the state makes 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
634 
available to campaigns. Such a change could force campaigns to adjust their 
calculus of contact and contact more low-income people during election 
season. Including the poor as targets of campaign mobilization would be an 
important first step toward a more egalitarian democracy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has seen the proliferation of election laws designed to 
suppress the vote.1 For many critics, the enactment of voter identification 
(voter ID) laws, the tightening of registration rules, and the reduction or 
elimination of convenient voting opportunities mark a return to a Jim Crow 
Era in which literacy tests, poll taxes, and white primaries served to suppress 
the African American vote.2 Given this striking analogy to our nation’s 
painful racial history, it is no surprise that voting rights advocates, legal 
scholars, and social scientists have focused so much attention on these tools 
as a form of new voter suppression.3 
 
 1 According to the Brennan Center for Justice, 
25 states have put in place new restrictions since [the 2010 election]—15 states have more 
restrictive voter ID laws in place (including six states with strict photo ID requirements), 12 have 
laws making it harder for citizens to register (and stay registered), ten made it more difficult to 
vote early or absentee, and three took action to make it harder to restore voting rights for people 
with past criminal convictions. 
New Voting Restrictions in America, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., http://www.brennancenter.org/new-
voting-restrictions-america [https://perma.cc/T7D4-W77M]. 
 2 See, e.g., N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 229 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(referring to North Carolina’s omnibus election reform bill as “the most restrictive voting law North 
Carolina has seen since the era of Jim Crow”); SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW 
POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION (2006); TOVA ANDREA WANG, THE POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION: 
DEFENDING AND EXPANDING AMERICANS’ RIGHT TO VOTE, at xiv (2012) (arguing that voter reforms that 
suppress voting are rarely legitimate and stem from years of such practices); Keith G. Bentele & Erin E. 
O’Brien, Jim Crow 2.0? Why States Consider and Adopt Restrictive Voter Access Policies, 11 PERSP. ON 
POL. 1088, 1092 (2013) (noting that comparisons between recent voting restrictions and historical voter 
suppression “are not difficult to make as voter suppression is viewed by many researchers familiar with 
the history of American elections as a pervasive and consistent feature of U.S. political practice and 
institutions.”); Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost of the Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, and the Price 
of Democracy, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2009) (arguing that voter ID laws requiring photo ID 
“are similar to other restrictions on the franchise, such as property requirements and poll taxes”); Ryan 
P. Haygood, The Past as Prologue: Defending Democracy Against Voter Suppression Tactics on the Eve 
of the 2012 Elections, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 1019, 1021 (2012) (“[T]his current assault on voting rights is 
consistent with the story of America’s contested relationship with democracy . . . .”); Alexander Keyssar, 
Voter Suppression Returns: Voting Rights and Partisan Practices, HARV. MAG., July–Aug. 2012, at 28, 
31 (“The recent wave of ID laws (and their cousins) bears a close resemblance to past episodes of voter 
suppression.”). 
 3 The following is a representative, though not exhaustive, sample of scholarship. On the effects of 
voter ID laws on turnout, see Stephen Ansolabehere, Effects of Identification Requirements on Voting: 
Evidence from the Experiences of Voters on Election Day, 42 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 127 (2009); Matt A. 
Barreto et al., The Disproportionate Impact of Voter-ID Requirements on the Electorate—New Evidence 
from Indiana, 42 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 111 (2009). 
 On the effects of voter ID laws on minority turnout, see Rachael V. Cobb et al., Can Voter ID Laws 
Be Administered in a Race-Neutral Manner? Evidence from the City of Boston in 2008, 7 Q. J. POL. SCI. 
1 (2012); Zoltan Hajnal et al., Voter Identification Laws and the Suppression of Minority Votes, 79 J. 
POL. 363 (2017). 
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Emphasis on the new voter suppression, however, has led voting rights 
advocates and legal scholars to overlook an entirely different form of voter 
suppression that operates much like the old. For at least the last fifty years, 
the turnout of persons in the lowest income quintile (a group we define as 
“the poor”) has been at such a low level that neither major political party has 
had real incentives to advance their interests in the political process.4  
Voting rights advocates and scholars have been drawn to the analogy 
between old and new voter suppression.5  But the more pressing analogy is 
between the effective disfranchisement of African Americans in the past and 
the effective disfranchisement of the poor in the present. Recent studies have 
shown that the poor—like African Americans in the Jim Crow South—go 
essentially unrepresented in the political process.6 This lack of representation 
appears rooted in the poor’s very low rate of voting compared to more 
affluent groups.7 The poor’s exclusion from politics ultimately contributes to 
 
 For scholarship on the determinants of voter ID laws, see Daniel R. Biggers & Michael J. Hanmer, 
Understanding the Adoption of Voter Identification Laws in the American States, 45 AM. POL. RES. 560 
(2017). 
 On voter registration and cutbacks to early voting, see, for example, MICHAEL J. HANMER, DISCOUNT 
VOTING: VOTER REGISTRATION REFORMS AND THEIR EFFECTS (2009); FRANCES FOX PIVEN ET AL., 
KEEPING DOWN THE BLACK VOTE: RACE AND THE DEMOBILIZATION OF AMERICAN VOTERS (2009); 
Stephen Ansolabehere & David M. Konisky, The Introduction of Voter Registration and Its Effect on 
Turnout, 14 POL. ANALYSIS 83 (2006); Barry C. Burden & Jacob R. Neiheisel, Election Administration 
and the Pure Effect of Voter Registration on Turnout, 66 POL. RES. Q. 77 (2013); Russell Weaver, The 
Racial Context of Convenience Voting Cutbacks: Early Voting in Ohio During the 2008 and 2012 U.S. 
Presidential Elections, 2015 SAGE OPEN 1. 
4 See NOLAN M. MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL 
RICHES 119 (2d ed. 2016) (noting that those “who are ineligible to vote are [increasingly] concentrated 
at the bottom of the income distribution, so politicians feel little pressure to respond to their interests”).  
For an overview of the literature on the disproportionate voice of the wealthy, see William W. Franko 
et al., Class Bias in Voter Turnout, Representation, and Income Inequality, 14 PERSP. ON POL. 351, 354 
(2016). 
5 See, e.g., Bentele & O’Brien, supra note 2. Another reason why legal scholars, at least, have ignored 
the disfranchisement of the poor is due to the Court’s refusal to recognize the poor as a class in need of 
special protection under the Constitution. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (rejecting a 
claim for special judicial protection under the Equal Protection Clause brought by low-income individuals 
seeking Medicaid reimbursement for medically necessary abortions on the basis of the unreasoned 
conclusion that “poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification”). This determination led to a 
constitutional scholarly exodus away from issues concerning the equal protection rights of the poor that 
encompass voting rights as well. 
6 See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW 
GILDED AGE 260–65 (2008) (testing the relationship between the ideological views of different income 
classes and United States senator roll call votes in the late 1980s and early 1990s and finding that “the 
views of low-income constituents had no discernible impact on the voting behavior of their senators”); 
MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN 
AMERICA 79–81 (2012) (finding that on issues of minimum wage, abortion, and sending troops to Bosnia, 
“when preferences between the well-off and the poor diverge, government policy bears absolutely no 
relationship to the degree of support or opposition among the poor”). 
7 See, e.g., JAN E. LEIGHLEY & JONATHAN NAGLER, WHO VOTES NOW? DEMOGRAPHICS, ISSUES, 
INEQUALITY, AND TURNOUT IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 6 (2014) (finding a consistent 30% gap in reported 
turnout between high- and low-income individuals since the 1970s). According to the U.S. Census, the 
114:633 (2019) Passive Voter Supression 
637 
the extreme political and economic inequality that characterizes the twenty-
first century’s new gilded age.8 
However, the sources of the effective disfranchisement of African 
Americans in the past and the poor in the present are distinct. Whereas the 
old voter suppression imposed tangible barriers that led to the 
disfranchisement of African Americans, such tangible obstacles explain very 
little of the rich–poor turnout disparity.9 Other factors are far more influential 
in the effective disfranchisement of the poor than the cost barriers to voting 
associated with the new voter suppression. 
Our argument is informed by a broader theoretical account of voting 
than that which appears in the legal academic literature and popular debates. 
Those discussions tend to focus on the tangible cost of voting as the primary 
determinant of voting.10 While we do not dispute the inverse relationship 
between tangible cost and voting, we highlight other overlooked factors 
relevant to the voting decision that can explain the effective disfranchisement 
of the poor. 
Rational choice and sociological theories of voting open up a host of 
additional explanations for the poor’s nonvoting. In these theories, factors 
such as information costs, affiliation with formal organizations, and 
inclusion within social networks are more important to an individual’s 
turnout decision than the tangible cost of voting.11 
When we incorporate these factors into the turnout decision, a more 
complete picture emerges of the poor’s low participation in elections. As 
rational choice theories emphasize, in order to vote, individuals need 
information about where, when, and how to vote. People also need a reason 
to vote, which can be derived from information about the candidate’s past 
actions, her policy positions and prescriptions for the future, and how the 
three relate to the individual’s preferences and needs. People who lack 
information, or find it hard to evaluate due to less education, may not be able 
to differentiate enough between candidates to see much benefit from voting 
 
average reported turnout among individuals with household incomes under $30,000 is below 50% while 
the average reported turnout among those with household incomes over $150,000 is more than 80%. U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2016: TABLE 7 (2017), 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-580.html 
[https://perma.cc/JT8F-MUP5]. 
8 See generally Franko et al., supra note 4, at 363 (finding that when political participation is skewed 
more to the “economic elite,” bias is high and the “distributional outcomes shaped by who holds elected 
office and the policies they enact become more skewed in favor of the rich”); Benjamin I. Page et al., 
Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51, 68 (2013) (finding 
that “the affluent participate disproportionately in politics” and that their policy preferences are consistent 
with actual policy in multiple areas, which “is, at least, suggestive of significant influence”). 
9 See infra Section II.A. 
10 See Ellis, supra note 2, at 1025. 
11 See infra Sections II.A–II.B. 
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and therefore may decide to abstain. The poor tend to be less educated and 
educational attainment has been consistently shown to be the most important 
determinant of turnout.12 
Sociological theories of voting explain that membership in formal 
groups or integration in social networks that include other voters and people 
interested in politics can subsidize the information costs to voting, provide 
solidary benefits for voting, and create a sense of civic duty to vote.13 Since 
the 1950s, sociological studies have shown that the poor are less likely to be 
affiliated with formal organizations and to be integrated into social networks 
of voters than other socioeconomic classes.14 This relative social isolation is 
therefore another critical factor contributing to the effective 
disfranchisement of the poor. 
A broader understanding of the sources of the effective 
disfranchisement of the poor opens the door to more responsive solutions 
than simply eliminating new voter suppression barriers. Ideal solutions 
might include equalizing educational opportunities for the poor and 
providing the poor with the necessary time and resources to integrate 
themselves into formal organizations and social networks. But these 
solutions would require a massive degree of public investment into poor 
communities, which is hard to imagine in the current political context, when 
social safety nets are being shredded rather than reinforced.15 
Alternative, more feasible, solutions involve a critical intervening 
variable that influences the decision to vote—the mobilization activities of 
candidates and political parties. Campaigns subsidize the information costs 
to voting by educating individuals on the logistics of voting—the time, place, 
and process of voting—and providing individuals with accounts of the 
candidate’s past actions, proposals for the future, and how the two might 
impact the potential voter’s needs and interests. Campaign mobilization 
activities can also activate formal and informal social networks through what 
experimental studies describe as a contagion effect. Individuals contacted by 
campaigns often share political information and embed a sense of duty to 
 
12 See, e.g., Rachel Milstein Sondheimer & Donald P. Green, Using Experiments to Estimate the 
Effects of Education on Voter Turnout, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 174, 174 (2010) (“The powerful relationship 
between education and voter turnout is arguably the most well-documented and robust finding in 
American survey research.”). 
13 See infra Section II.B. 
14 See sources cited infra note 150. 
15 See, e.g., Bertrall L. Ross II, Addressing Inequality in the Age of Citizens United, 93 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1120, 1132–35 (2018) (describing the decline in redistributive policies and protections for lower 
income and working-class people in the United States over the past forty years). 
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vote within others in their social networks, thereby increasing the number of 
voters in the network.16 
Understanding mobilization activities as key intervening variables that 
influence turnout sheds light on an important source of the effective 
disfranchisement of the poor. In deciding whom to mobilize, campaigns 
utilize what we label a “calculus of contact.” Campaigns use a cost–benefit 
calculation to engage in the most cost-effective mobilization strategies. The 
primary benefit to campaigns from contacting individuals is a favorable vote, 
with the campaigns’ goal being to produce enough favorable votes to win 
elections.17 Not every contact produces an equal probability of a favorable 
vote. Therefore, campaigns tend to make two probability calculations in their 
decisions about whom to contact. First, campaigns assess the probability that 
contact will influence an individual to vote, and to vote favorably for the 
candidate as a result of the contact. Second, they assess how important it is 
to contact particular individuals in order to win the election. The costs of 
contact include the time and resources devoted to a canvassing operation and 
the data and technology needed to inform the probability calculations on the 
benefits side. 
This calculus of contact has contributed to a consistent socioeconomic 
class disparity in whom campaigns contact.18 Campaigns contact the poor 
less because the poor vote less than other socioeconomic classes.19 This low 
turnout is due to the higher costs—information and otherwise—that they 
incur to vote and their relative lack of integration into formal organizations 
and informal social networks.20 The poor’s relative lack of voting history 
contributes to greater uncertainty about their future voting behavior and thus 
increases the risk to campaigns that these individuals might fail to produce a 
vote, or that they might even vote for one’s opponent in the election. 
That contact gap between the poor and members of other 
socioeconomic classes is of monumental importance in explaining why the 
poor vote less than other socioeconomic classes. Experimental studies 
 
16 Dan Braha & Marcus A. M. de Aguiar, Voting Contagion: Modeling and Analysis of a Century of 
U.S. Presidential Elections, 12 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2017) (“These results suggest that social contagion 
effects are becoming more instrumental in shaping large-scale collective political behavior, with 
implications on democratic electoral processes and policies.”); David W. Nickerson, Is Voting 
Contagious? Evidence from Two Field Experiments, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 49, 54 (2008) (“The 
unavoidable conclusion is that voting is a highly contagious behavior and an important determinant of 
turnout.”). 
17 See, e.g., Gary W. Cox et al., Mobilization, Social Networks, and Turnout: Evidence from Japan, 
50 WORLD POL. 447, 447 (1998) (“[A] party will target those unlikely to vote if not mobilized, but who 
would very likely support the party in question if they did get to the polls.”). 
18 See infra Section II.C. 
19 See infra Section II.C. 
20 See infra Section II.C. 
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testing the relationship between voter contact and turnout have shown that 
campaign contact substantially increases turnout.21 Other experimental 
studies have shown that the indirect effect of mobilization, the so-called 
contagion effect, multiplies the turnout effect from contact.22 
We argue that campaigns’ use of the calculus of contact to 
disproportionately orient their mobilization activities away from the poor 
operates as a form of voter suppression. This form of voter suppression is 
passive in that it arises from campaigns’ neglect of a part of the population 
in their mobilization activities. While distinct in operation, this passive voter 
suppression shares something in common with the old active voter 
suppression of the post-Reconstruction redemption period: it has effectively 
disfranchised an entire class of voters. 
What can the law do about passive voter suppression? Since political 
campaigns, and not the state, are the principal agents of passive voter 
suppression and since passive voter suppression arises from a decision by a 
campaign to not do something, a constitutional claim against the practice is 
dubious, at best. Using the law to respond to passive voter suppression will 
therefore require shifting from the conventional use of law in the election 
space as a tool to prohibit conduct, to law as a tool to incentivize conduct. 
In this Article, we argue for a legal intervention that could represent a 
first step in combating passive voter suppression that targets the information 
that states make available to campaigns for electoral purposes. States vary in 
terms of what information they make accessible to campaigns. Nearly half 
of the states give campaigns access to registered voters’ partisan affiliation 
 
21 DONALD P. GREEN & ALAN S. GERBER, GET OUT THE VOTE: HOW TO INCREASE VOTER  
TURNOUT 9 (3d ed. 2015) (“[T]he more personal the interaction between campaign and potential voter, 
the more it raises a person’s chances of voting.”); Kevin Arceneaux & David W. Nickerson, Who Is 
Mobilized to Vote? A Re-analysis of 11 Field Experiments, 53 AM. J POL. SCI. 1, 11–12 (2009) 
(highlighting the unreported heterogeneous effects in previous experiments by showing that the effects 
of contact on turnout (between 1.3 to 13.2 percentage points) depends on the premobilization propensity 
to vote and the competitiveness of the election); Alan S. Gerber & Donald P. Green, The Effects of 
Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment, 94 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 653, 661 (2000) [hereinafter Gerber & Green, The Effects of Canvassing] (“Face-to-face interaction 
dramatically increases the chance that voters will go to the polls.”); Donald P. Green et al., Getting Out 
the Vote in Local Elections: Results from Six Door-to-Door Canvassing Experiments, 65 J. POL. 1083, 
1094 (2003) (“Each successful contact with a registered citizen raises that individual’s probability of 
voting by approximately 7 percentage points . . . .”); Melissa R. Michelson, Getting Out the Latino Vote: 
How Door-to-Door Canvassing Influences Voter Turnout in Rural Central California, 25 POL. BEHAV. 
247, 256–57 (2003) (finding that canvassing is effective even in low turnout elections in rural areas, 
increasing an individual’s likelihood of voting up to sixteen percentage points among Latino Democrats); 
David W. Nickerson, Volunteer Phone Calls Can Increase Turnout: Evidence from Eight Field 
Experiments, 34 AM. POL. RES. 271, 271 (2006) [hereinafter, Nickerson, Volunteer Phone Calls Can 
Increase Turnout] (“[P]hone calls are found to boost turnout 3.8 percentage points.”); David Niven, The 
Mobilization Solution? Face-to-Face Contact and Voter Turnout in a Municipal Election, 66 J. POL. 868, 
868 (2004) (“Controlling for their past voting history, the face-to-face mobilization effort did increase 
turnout by about five points.”). 
22 See sources cited supra note 16. 
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and voting history, eight states deny campaigns access to both pieces of 
information, and the remaining states grant campaigns access to individuals’ 
voting history or partisan affiliation, but not both.23 All states except 
Massachusetts collect and make accessible to campaigns information about 
only registered voters, leaving campaigns completely in the dark about the 
identity, address, voting history, if any, and partisan affiliation of 
unregistered persons.24 
We argue that the current information environments for campaigns in 
the different states contribute in varying degrees to the socioeconomic biases 
in contact that lead to passive voter suppression. Campaigns use lists of 
registered voters to identify targets for contact and they tend to contact 
individuals with more substantial voting histories and clearer partisan 
orientations.25 That leads campaigns to orient their mobilization activities 
away from the poor because the poor are substantially more likely than other 
income classes to be unregistered, to lack a voting history, and to have more 
ambiguous or unknown partisan affiliations.26 
An important intervention that could reduce these socioeconomic class 
disparities in campaigns’ mobilization activities involves changing the 
information environments in which campaigns operate. Here we set forth a 
preliminary proposal as the best means for combating passive voter 
suppression: for states to provide more information to campaigns regarding 
eligible voters’ partisan preferences through automatic voter registration 
while withholding individuals’ voting histories. Changing the information 
available to campaigns is an important practical first step, but more reforms 
would be necessary to effectively enfranchise the poor. In future work, we 
will focus on other interventions aimed at making elections more competitive 
as additional steps to creating a more egalitarian democracy. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. In Part I, we engage the analogy 
between old and new voter suppression. We argue that while the analogy 
holds when thinking about the use of voter suppression for partisan electoral 
advantage, it ultimately shifts attention away from a more troubling issue: 
the passive voter suppression that effectively disfranchises low-income 
communities. In Part II, we broaden the theoretical lens used in legal 
scholarship to explain individuals’ decisions to vote, introducing social 
science theories of voting that incorporate information costs, affiliation with 
formal organizations, and integration into politically active informal social 
 
23 See infra Table 1; see also infra notes 261–262 and accompanying text (providing a taxonomy of 
states on the basis of the information they make available to campaigns). 
24 See infra Section IV.B.2. 
25 See infra Section IV.A. 
26 See infra note 226 and accompanying text. 
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networks as key variables in turnout decisions. In Part III, we turn our 
attention to the effect of campaign mobilization activities on voting. Using 
proprietary data from a campaign data vendor, Catalist, and other public 
sources of data, we identify a consistent and persistent socioeconomic class-
based disparity in campaigns’ voter contact over the past fifty years and 
relate it to the phenomenon we label passive voter suppression. Finally, in 
Part IV, we suggest an initial legal intervention that could reduce passive 
voter suppression by shifting campaigns’ calculus of contact to incentivize 
more equal contacts with the poor. 
I. THE ANALOGY BETWEEN THE OLD AND NEW VOTER SUPPRESSION 
On July 10, 2012, then-Attorney General Eric Holder addressed the 
annual convention for the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP).27 In the year leading up to the speech, five 
Republican-controlled state legislatures had moved toward adopting strict 
photo ID requirements to vote.28 Republican leaders in those states justified 
the new ID laws on the basis of mostly unsubstantiated assertions of voter 
impersonation fraud.29 The day before Holder’s speech, a trial began in 
federal district court where the State of Texas was seeking a declaratory 
judgment against the Department of Justice to secure preclearance of its new 
voter ID law under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.30 
 
27 Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Address at the NAACP Annual Convention (July 10, 2012),  
available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-naacp-annual-
convention [https://perma.cc/7Q4R-6AX2]. 
28 See History of Voter ID, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 31, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id-history [https://perma.cc/77S5-LVU9] (noting that Kansas, 
Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin made moves to adopt strict photo identification 
requirements for voting in 2011). 
29 See, e.g., Editorial Board, Voting Laws Must Be Carefully Considered, GREEN BAY PRESS 
GAZETTE, Dec. 9, 2010, at A5 (quoting Wisconsin Republican state senator Scott Fitzgerald, “we 
continue to see these isolated incidents of people trying to vote five, six times a day; people voting based 
on some sort of fraudulent documentation that’s offered”); William D. Hicks et al., A Principle or a 
Strategy? Voter Identification Laws and Partisan Competition in the American States, 68 POL. RES. Q. 
18, 20–23 (2015) (describing the overwhelming Republican support for voter ID laws in the state 
legislatures that have adopted them and the overwhelming Democratic opposition to these laws); Kris 
Kobach, Opinion, Voter ID Laws are Good Protection Against Fraud, WASH. POST (July 13, 2011), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/voter-id-laws-are-good-protection-against-fraud/2011/07/08 
/gIQAGnURBI_story.html [https://perma.cc/8PEN-5HP5] (op-ed by Kansas Secretary of State and 
architect of Kansas voter ID law who wrote that “[u]nfortunately, voter fraud has become a well-
documented reality in American elections”); see also infra note 72. 
30 See Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 114–15 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying Texas’s request 
because evidence showed the law would “likely have a retrogressive effect” in violation of Section 5 of 
the VRA), vacated and remanded, 570 U.S. 928 (2013) (overruled in light of Shelby County v. Holder, 
570 U.S. 529 (2013), overturning Section 5 as unconstitutional); Devlin Barrett, U.S. and Texas Battle in 
Court  
over Voter I.D., WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023040 
22004577516953618032404 [https://perma.cc/C534-LUPD]. 
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In his speech, Holder referred to the Justice Department’s findings that 
the Texas voter ID law “would be harmful to minority voters.”31 Holder noted 
how “[u]nder the proposed law, concealed handgun licenses would be 
acceptable forms of photo ID—but student IDs would not.”32 And he 
described how “[m]any of those without IDs would have to travel great 
distances to get them—and some would struggle to pay for the documents 
they might need to obtain them.”33 Then, in an unscripted part of the speech, 
Holder announced, “we call those poll taxes.”34 That was not the first time 
that someone drew the analogy between voter ID laws and poll taxes—
between new voter suppression tools and old.35 But coming from the chief 
law enforcement officer of the United States and the closest cabinet member 
to then-President Barack Obama, the analogy proved particularly 
noteworthy. Some expressed outrage about the analogy. A Wall Street 
Journal editorial accused Holder of playing “the race card to drive up black 
voter turnout” in the coming presidential election.36 Others applauded the 
Attorney General and repeated the analogy, describing voter ID laws as 
modern-day poll taxes and literacy tests.37 
Thus far no one has interrogated the analogy between the old and new 
voter suppression in any depth. The remainder of Part I does that. We show 
that the analogy holds insofar as the focus is on the use of voter suppression 
tools to advance the goal of partisan electoral advantage. But this 
interrogation also reveals the limits of the analogy as it ignores a critical 
distinction between the old and new voter suppression. The old voter 
suppression of the post-Reconstruction redemption period resulted in the 
effective disfranchisement of an entire group of voters—African Americans. 
The new voter suppression of the current era has not had this disfranchising 
effect on any group of voters—even the poor who are most vulnerable to 
such laws. Finally, this interrogation exposes the key issue that the analogy 
between old and new voter suppression ultimately masks: the persistent 
effective disfranchisement of the poor through passive means. 
 
31 See Holder, supra note 27. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 NAACP, 2012 NAACP Convention – Eric Holder, YOUTUBE 17:05–17:20 (July 10, 2012), https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mafc42MM5zs [https://perma.cc/Q3JL-QTMY]. 
35 See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 2, at 1025–26. 
36 Editorial, Holder’s Jim Crow Politics, WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2012, 7:22 PM), https://www.wsj. 
com/articles/SB10001424052702304022004577519202610207274 [https://perma.cc/GAZ2-8U67]. 
37 See, e.g., Charles Postel, Why Voter ID Laws Are like a Poll Tax, POLITICO (Aug. 7, 2012, 12:26 
AM), https://politi.co/2yXQqbK [https://perma.cc/4US5-G93E] (“[T]hese laws function very much like 
a poll tax.”); Al Sharpton, Opinion, Voting in Jeopardy, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2012, at A13 (“These new 
ID laws take us backward; they truly are nothing more than modern-day poll taxes and literacy tests.”).  
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A. Where the Analogy Holds 
The 2016 presidential election surprised many. Very few people, 
including perhaps the future President himself, expected Donald Trump to 
win.38 Even fewer expected Trump to win the state of Wisconsin, a state that 
Barack Obama won rather decisively in 2008 and 2012, and one that Hillary 
Clinton did not campaign in out of confidence that the state would remain a 
pillar in a blue wall of states assuring Democratic victory in the election.39 
But the blue wall crumbled as Trump won the state.40 The margin was 
narrow—less than 23,000 votes (a mere 0.77%) separated the two 
candidates—but that margin guaranteed the winner all ten of the state’s 
electoral college votes.41 
In 2011, Republican Governor Scott Walker and the Republican-
controlled state legislature passed a strict voter ID law.42 Court challenges 
would delay the law from going into effect until 2015.43 Of the closely 
contested blue wall states that Trump won in the 2016 presidential election, 
Wisconsin was the only one to have strict photo ID requirements. Some 
suggested that the ID requirement changed the election outcome in the 
state.44 
 
38 Michael Wolff, Donald Trump Didn’t Want to Be President, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 8, 2018), 
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/01/michael-wolff-fire-and-fury-book-donald-trump.html 
[https://perma.cc/8NLH-9S7C]. 
39 HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, WHAT HAPPENED 394–95 (2017). 
40 Craig Gilbert et al., How Clinton Lost “Blue Wall” States of Michigan, Pennsylvania,  
Wisconsin, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov. 9, 2016, 9:03 PM, updated Nov. 10, 2016, 11:31 AM), 
https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/2016/11/09/93572020 [https://perma.cc/L9N7-N3VQ]. 
41 Wisconsin Results, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017, 11:22 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/ 
2016/results/wisconsin [https://perma.cc/25M9-5RT3]; see also Jack E. Riggs et al., Electoral College 
Winner’s Advantage, 42 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 353, 353 (2009) (“The winner-take-all methodology of 
awarding electoral votes, [is] currently used by all states except Maine and Nebraska . . . .”).  
While close, the election in Wisconsin was not pivotal like Florida famously was in the 2000 
presidential election contest between George Bush and Al Gore. See Thomas E. Mann, Reflections on the 
2000 U.S. Presidential Election, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 1, 2001), https://brook.gs/2NiaZ64 
[https://perma.cc/9KHH-234X]. Although Trump lost the popular vote by nearly three million votes, he 
won the Electoral College by 77 votes as other parts of the blue wall, Pennsylvania and Michigan, also 
fell by similarly small margins (0.72% and 0.23% respectively). Philip Bump, Donald Trump Will Be 
President Thanks to 80,000 People in Three States, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2016, 2:38 PM), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/01/donald-trump-will-be-president-thanks-to-80000-
people-in-three-states [https://perma.cc/TVD3-TQDJ]; Presidential Election Results: Donald J. Trump 
Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://nyti.ms/2PcFpLz [https://perma.cc/S2FH-U93Q]. 
42 See WIS. STAT. § 6.79(2)(a); History of Voter ID, supra note 28.  
43 See Shawn Johnson & Laurel White, As Voting Begins, a Look Back at the Fight over Wisconsin’s 
Voter ID Law, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 26, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.wpr.org/voting-begins-look-
back-fight-over-wisconsins-voter-id-law [https://perma.cc/9ZRF-MXLJ]. 
44 See, e.g., KENNETH R. MAYER & MICHAEL G. DECRESCENZO, SUPPORTING INFORMATION: 
ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF VOTER ID ON NONVOTERS IN WISCONSIN IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION 5 (2017), https://elections.wisc.edu/voter-id-study [https://perma.cc/DG5K-8ZYV] (“We 
estimate that 11.2% of nonvoting registrants in Dane and Milwaukee counties were ‘deterred’ in some 
way from voting by the voter ID law . . . .”). 
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Hillary Clinton seemed to agree. In her election postmortem, What 
Happened, Clinton used Wisconsin as a prime example of the effect of voter 
suppression on the outcome of the election. One study that Clinton cited 
found that the Wisconsin voter ID law “helped reduce turnout by 200,000 
votes, primarily from low-income and minority areas” that tend to be more 
Democratic.45 She then pointed to a 13% decline in turnout in the heavily 
Democratic and majority low-income and minority city of Milwaukee.46 
Finally, she compared turnout in Wisconsin with that of the neighboring 
states of Minnesota and Illinois. In Minnesota, where the state legislature did 
not impose new voter restrictions for the 2016 election, “turnout in heavily 
African American counties declined much less and overall turnout was 
essentially flat.”47 In Illinois, where the state legislature actually passed laws 
designed to make it easier to vote, turnout increased by 5% overall, and 
African American turnout was 14% higher than in Wisconsin.48 A Wisconsin 
Republican state representative predicted that “the new law would help 
Trump pull off an upset in the state.” Clinton concluded, “[i]t turns out he 
was right.”49 
So many factors go into an election outcome that it is difficult to 
identify any as decisive.50 But Clinton’s analysis is consistent with empirical 
studies that suggest voter ID laws can matter in close elections. Empirical 
studies of the 2014 midterm and 2016 presidential election were mixed in 
their findings about the effect of voter ID laws on the turnout of groups that 
tend to vote Democratic—racial minorities, persons with disabilities, the 
poor, and the young.51 Some studies focusing on specific jurisdictions found 
no overall turnout effect while others found that voter ID laws potentially 
 
45 CLINTON, supra note 39, at 420. 
46 Id. As of July 2018, the nonwhite population of Milwaukee is 54.2%. See Quickfacts, Milwaukee 
City, Wisconsin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/milwaukeecitywisconsin 
[https://perma.cc/RNM4-6U9B]. 
47 CLINTON, supra note 39, at 420. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 It is inherently difficult to determine which of the many factors relevant to an election outcome 
are ultimately decisive, but Republican lawmakers that are behind the adoption of the voter ID laws seem 
to think that the effects of these laws could prove decisive in close elections. See, e.g., Hicks, supra note 
29, at 29 (finding that legislatures with more Republicans in states that are more competitive are 
significantly more likely to adopt restrictive voter ID laws than other states). 
51 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-634, ELECTIONS: ISSUES RELATED TO  
STATE VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS 39–43 (2014), https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665966.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R897-6879] (summarizing studies of the effect of voter ID laws on racial minority 
turnout); Bernard L. Fraga & Michael G. Miller, Who Does Voter ID Keep from Voting?, 13, 20–21, 21 
tbl.2 (Dec. 14, 2018) (working paper) (on file with authors) (finding 42.3% of the 15,682 individuals who 
filed a “reasonable impediment declaration” for lack of voter ID and were matched to the Texas voter file 
in 2016 were nonwhite).  
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reduced the turnout of Democratic-leaning groups up to 5%.52 These studies, 
however, predated the implementation of most of the strict photo ID laws 
currently in place, including in Wisconsin. 
Political scientists Zoltan Hajnal, Nazita Lajevardi, and Lindsay 
Nielson recently published the first empirical study that measures the effect 
of strict photo ID laws on turnout nationwide.53 Using data from the 
Cooperative Congressional Election Study between 2006 and 2014, the 
authors compare turnout for different Democratic-leaning groups in states 
with strict photo ID laws and states without strict photo ID laws, controlling 
for other factors that could influence turnout.54 They report that in general 
election contests, the turnout gap between Latinos and Whites is more than 
twice as large in strict ID states (13.5%) compared to non-strict ID states 
(4.9%).55 The Asian–White turnout gap is 11.5% in strict ID states compared 
to 6.5% in non-strict ID states, and the gap between White and African 
American voters is 5.1% in strict ID states compared to 2.9% in non-strict 
ID states.56 Such increases in the turnout gap between mostly Republican 
 
52 Compare Daniel J. Hopkins et al., Voting but for the Law: Evidence from Virginia on Photo 
Identification Requirements, 14 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 79, 88, 96–100 (2017) (finding that 222 ballots, 
cast provisionally for lack of voter ID, were never counted of nearly 2.19 million votes cast in the 2014 
Virginia midterm election (0.0001%); factoring in the potential deterrence effect of voter ID, the authors 
show that Democratic voters were 5.1% less likely to vote after the implementation of Virginia’s strict 
voter ID law, though turnout among Black voters increase by approximately 2.5%), and U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 51, at 52 (finding that voter ID laws reduced turnout among African 
American registrants by 3.7% in Kansas and 1.5% in Tennessee, relative to white registrants) with 
Benjamin Highton, Voter Identification Laws and Turnout in the United States, 20 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 
149, 164 (2017) (reviewing the voter ID literature and concluding “[t]o the extent that sound evidence 
exists, it shows modest turnout effects and only minor differences across politically relevant groups”).  
53 Hajnal et al., supra note 3, at 364. 
54 Id. at 367. 
55 Hajnal et al., supra note 3, at 369 (citing Cooperative Congressional Election Study, HARV. U., 
available at https://cces.gov.harvard.edu/pages/welcome-cooperative-congressional-election-study 
[https://perma.cc/U8R4-XKE2]). 
56 Id. at 369–71. The effect sizes that the authors find are even larger for primary elections. The 
turnout gap is more than three times as large in strict ID states for Latinos and Asians, and more than five 
times as large for African American voters. As the authors note, “[i]n primaries, the effects of voter 
identification laws are more pronounced and more negative for those on the political left.” Id. at 371. 
The Hajnal et al. findings about the racially disproportionate effect of voter ID laws triggered an 
intense debate amongst political scientists. In a response to the article, Professors Justin Grimmer, Eitan 
Hersh, Marc Meredith, Jonathan Mummolo, and Clayton Nall challenged the study’s findings. Justin 
Grimmer et al., Obstacles to Estimating Voter ID Laws’ Effect on Turnout, 80 J. POL. 1045, 1045–46 
(2018). The response criticized Hajnal et al.’s use of survey data, coding decisions, and reliance on cross-
sectional regressions that “[do] not adequately account for unobserved baseline differences between states 
with and without these laws.” Id. at 1045–46. Using Hajnal et al.’s data, but employing a fixed effects 
model, Grimmer et al. found that voter ID laws “increased turnout among White, African American, 
Latino, Asian American, and mixed-race voters by 10.9, 10.4, 6.5, 12.5, and 8.3 percentage points in 
general elections, respectively.” Id. at 1049. Furthermore, they found that the large white–minority voting 
gaps in states that adopted voter ID laws are driven by “increased white turnout . . . not by a drop in 
minority turnout.” Id. 
In a reply, Hajnal et al. claim that Grimmer et al. “present[] a misleading and flawed picture of the 
impact of strict ID laws” and reproduce findings supporting the claim in their original article that voter 
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Whites and mostly Democratic racial minorities could change election 
outcomes in close races.57 
Proponents of the new voter suppression laws have claimed that they 
were intended to guard against fraud, the perception of fraud, and to 
otherwise protect the integrity of elections.58 But the history of these new 
voter suppression laws suggests that lawmakers had partisan electoral 
advantage as their primary goal.59 Although there are some scattered 
statements by lawmakers indicating the partisan (and even racist) 
motivations driving the adoption of the new voter suppression laws, it is the 
circumstantial evidence surrounding these laws that is most persuasive.60 In 
2001, fourteen states, including both states with Democratic and Republican 
majorities, had laws requesting that voters show some form of identification 
at the polls.61 These laws allowed voters to present a variety of different 
 
ID laws have a racially disproportionate effect for Latinos in general elections and for Latinos, Blacks, 
Asian-Americans, and multiracial Americans in primary elections. Zoltan Hajnal et al., We All Agree: 
Strict Voter ID Laws Disproportionately Burden Minorities, 80 J. POL. 1052, 1052–53 (2018). 
57 See Wide Gender Gap, Growing Educational Divide in Voters’ Party Identification, PEW RES. 
CTR. 7–8 (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2018/03/03-20-18-
Party-Identification-CORRECTED.pdf [https://perma.cc/27EH-X7UG] (describing the continued racial 
divisions in partisan identification). 
58 See, e.g., Michael D. Gilbert, The Problem of Voter Fraud, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 739, 741, 743–
46 (2015) (describing the anti-fraud defense of voter ID laws). 
59 Bentele & O’Brien, supra note 2, at 1089 (“[W]e argue that the Republican Party has engaged in 
strategic demobilization efforts in response to changing demographics, shifting electoral fortunes, and an 
internal rightward ideological drift among the party faithful.”); Daniel R. Biggers & Michael J. Hanmer, 
Understanding the Adoption of Voter Identification Laws in the American States, 45 AM. POL. RES. 560, 
580 (2017) (“Using this newly collected data, we determined that the story behind the adoption of a 
variety of different voter ID laws is primarily a partisan one . . . . These results provide substantial support 
for our hypotheses: The switch to pivot player status by the Republican Party creates the ability and 
impetus to modify existing voter ID laws,” where “pivot player status” refers to the switch from minority 
party to control of the legislature and governorship.); Seth C. McKee, Politics Is Local: State Legislator 
Voting on Restrictive Voter Identification Legislation, 2015 RES. & POL. 1, 6 (“Beyond the widely 
anticipated finding that Republicans are much more supportive of restrictive voter ID legislation . . . 
among Republican legislators, a higher black district population increases legislators’ support for voter 
ID, whereas among Democratic lawmakers, a higher black district population reduces legislators’ 
likelihood of voting in favor of restrictive voter ID legislation.”). 
60 For examples of lawmakers expressing their motivation for voter ID laws, see Aaron Blake, 
Republicans Keep Admitting that Voter ID Helps Them Win, for Some Reason, WASH. POST: THE  
FIX (Apr. 7, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/04/07/republicans- 
should-really-stop-admitting-that-voter-id-helps-them-win [https://perma.cc/XBM2-WVGK] (quoting 
Wisconsin Republican representative Glenn Grothman as saying, “I think Hillary Clinton is about the 
weakest candidate that the Democrats have ever put up and now we have photo ID and I think photo ID 
is going to make a little bit of a difference as well”; Pennsylvania state House Majority Leader Mike 
Turzai (R) saying that voter ID “is going to allow Governor Romney to win the state of Pennsylvania”; 
Pennsylvania GOP Chairman Robert Gleason who pointed to Obama’s smaller margin of victory in 2012 
compared to 2008 and said, “I think that probably photo ID helped a bit in that”; and Buncombe County, 
North Carolina Republican precinct chairman Don Yelton who said, “if [voter ID] hurts a bunch of lazy 
blacks that want the government to give them everything, so be it”).  
61 See Hicks, supra note 29, at 20–21; History of Voter ID, supra note 28. 
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forms of identification documents and voters were allowed to cast a regular 
ballot even when they lacked identification.62 
In 2002, the Help America Vote Act’s (HAVA) response to the election 
administration and accessibility problems associated with the 2000 election 
required those who register by mail to provide voter identification when they 
vote.63 In 2005, the bipartisan Commission on Federal Election Reform went 
further and proposed a uniform system of voter identification in which 
individuals would be required to present photo IDs at the polls, with such 
IDs being made readily accessible to those who lack it.64 That Republican-
introduced proposal proved controversial, producing three formal dissents.65 
That same year, Republican-controlled legislatures in Georgia and Indiana 
passed the first two state laws requiring voters to present a photo 
identification in order to vote.66 In 2006, the Republican-controlled 
legislature in Missouri followed suit,67 but the state’s Supreme Court struck 
down the law as inconsistent with the state constitution.68 The Court held that 
the concern about voter fraud among state lawmakers was real, but that the 
problem was not, noting a lack of supportive evidence.69 
In 2008, state lawmakers in Indiana defended the state’s voter ID law 
against a federal constitutional challenge but were unable to present a single 
prior example of voter impersonation fraud in the State.70 The only example 
 
62 History of Voter ID, supra note 28. 
63 Help America Vote Act of 2002 § 303(b)(ii) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 21083(b)(2)(A)); 
see also WANG, supra note 2, at 79 (identifying the narrow ID requirement in HAVA as the precursor to 
“a subsequent flood of more-stringent voter identification requirements enacted at the state level”).  
64 COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS: REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, at iv (2005), https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/ 
Exhibit%20M.PDF [https://perma.cc/RJ7Y-MZHR] (“[T]o make sure that a person arriving at a polling 
site is the same one who is named on the list, we propose a uniform system of voter identification based 
on the ‘REAL ID card’ or an equivalent for people without a drivers [sic] license. To prevent the ID from 
being a barrier to voting, we recommend that states use the registration and ID process to enfranchise 
more voters than ever.”). 
65 Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 633 n.4 (2007) (identifying the 
formal dissenters as himself and another racial-minority-commission member and Democratic U.S. 
Senator Tom Daschle).  
66 GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417 (2006); IND. CODE § 3-10-1-7.2 (2006). 
67 MO. REV. STAT. § 115.427 (2006). 
68 Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 204 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam). 
69 Id. at 218 (“While it is agreed here that the State’s concern about the perception of fraud is real, if 
this Court were to approve the placement of severe restrictions on Missourians’ fundamental rights owing 
to the mere perception of a problem in this instance, then the tactic of shaping public misperception could 
be used in the future as a mechanism for further burdening the right to vote or other fundamental rights.”). 
70 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 226 (2008) (discounting the state’s interest 
against fraud because “the State has not come across a single instance of in-person voter impersonation 
fraud in all of Indiana’s history. Neither the District Court nor the Indiana General Assembly that passed 
the Voter ID Law was given any evidence whatsoever of in-person voter impersonation fraud in the State” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
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the state presented involved absentee voter fraud that the law did not target.71 
What the Indiana legislatures did have was statistics on who possessed photo 
IDs, particularly driver’s licenses. Those statistics revealed large disparities 
in White and minority ownership of photo identification, which indicated 
that the law would impact a larger share of minority, more Democratic voters 
than White, more Republican voters.72 The United States Supreme Court 
nonetheless upheld Indiana’s law against a facial challenge. After 
Republicans gained control of both houses in twenty-six legislatures along 
with twenty-nine state governorships in 2010, strict voter ID laws 
proliferated. Such laws passed only in states where Republicans completely 
controlled the legislature and the Governorship.73 States continued to justify 
these laws on the basis of fraud prevention. But like Georgia, Missouri, and 
Indiana, the new adopters offered scant evidence of the voter impersonation 
fraud that voter ID laws would prevent while continuing to ignore much 
stronger evidence of absentee ballot fraud that voter ID laws would not 
address.74 This strange policy choice had partisan roots. Absentee voters are 
mostly Republican-leaning while voters that go to the polls are mostly 
Democratic-leaning.75 While the Republican state legislatures lacked 
 
71 Id. at 195–96 (referring to “Indiana’s own experience with fraudulent voting in the 2003 
Democratic primary for East Chicago Mayor—though perpetrated using absentee ballots and not in-
person fraud” (internal footnote omitted)). 
72 Importantly, the district court granted the State of Indiana’s summary judgment motion in part 
because plaintiffs did not introduce “evidence of a single, individual Indiana resident who will be unable 
to vote as a result of [the voter ID law] or who will have his or her right to vote unduly burdened by its 
requirements.” Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 783 (S.D. Ind. 2006). On this 
point, the Court of Appeals noted that even though the petitioners had not been able to produce anybody 
who said they would vote but for lack of ID, their claim was valid inasmuch as the voter ID law “may 
require the Democratic Party and the other organizational plaintiffs to work harder to get every last one 
of their supporters to the polls.” Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2007), 
aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2006).  
73 See History of Voter ID, supra note 28.  
74 See e.g., Brief for the United States in Opposition, Abbott v. Veasey, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017) (No. 
16-393), 2016 WL 6958563, at *3 (comparing the approximately 20 million votes cast in Texas during 
the prior decade to the mere “two cases of in-person voter impersonation” that “were identified and 
prosecuted to conviction”); LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE MYTH OF VOTER FRAUD 57–76 (2010) 
(cataloging the low incidence of voter impersonation fraud in select states); Natasha Khan & Corbin 
Carson, Data: Voter Impersonation a Rarity, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2012, at A3 (describing “[a] new 
nationwide analysis of more than 2,000 cases of alleged election fraud over the past dozen years . . . [that] 
found 10 cases of alleged in-person voter impersonation since 2000” (emphasis omitted)).  
75 See, e.g., Alan Blinder & Michael Wines, North Carolina Republicans Targeted Voter Fraud. Did 
They Look at the Wrong Kind?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/05/ 
us/politics/north-carolina-vote-fraud-absentee.html [https://perma.cc/NY49-PJZH] (“Republicans had 
generally dominated absentee ballots that were cast through the mail . . . .”); Sarah Childress, Why Voter 
ID Laws Aren’t Really About Fraud, PBS FRONTLINE (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
frontline/article/why-voter-id-laws-arent-really-about-fraud [https://perma.cc/N692-UYQA] (“In 2012, 
nearly half, or 46 percent, of mail-in voters were aged 60 and older, and more than 75 percent were White, 
according to an analysis by Michael McDonald, a political science professor at the University of Florida 
who tracks demographic trends in voting. Older White Americans generally are more likely to vote 
Republican.”); Adam Liptak, Error and Fraud at Issue as Absentee Voting Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 
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evidence of voter impersonation fraud, they certainly had access to data 
showing racial and class disparities, often large disparities, in photo ID 
possession.76 Those circumstantial bits of evidence combined with naked 
assertions of partisan intent point to partisan electoral advantage as the 
primary reason for the adoption of voter ID laws. 
Voter ID laws were not the only voter suppression tool that Republicans 
appeared to use for partisan advantage. Voter roll purges by Republican-
controlled secretaries of state in Georgia and Ohio;77 the suspension and 
reduction of early voting in the Republican-controlled states of Florida, 
Georgia, Ohio, and Wisconsin;78 restrictions on registration drives or third 
party registration in Republican-controlled Florida, Iowa, and Texas;79 and 
proof of citizenship voting requirements in Republican-controlled Alabama, 
Kansas, and Tennessee all targeted groups critical to the Democratic 
coalition that elected and re-elected President Obama.80 
Insofar as the new voter suppression aims to achieve partisan electoral 
advantage, these laws share much in common with the old voter suppression 
of the past. The Fifteenth Amendment and Reconstruction temporarily 
introduced a new era of racially inclusive politics in which African 
Americans under the banner of the Republican Party voted and elected their 
own to political office in the South.81 However, the Democratic Party and the 
slavocracy that powered it would not go quietly. A relatively short period of 
 
2012, at A1 (“Republicans are in fact more likely than Democrats to vote absentee. In the 2008 general 
election in Florida, 47 percent of absentee voters were Republicans and 36 percent were Democrats.”). 
76 Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice to C. 
Havird Jones, Jr., Esq., Assistant Deputy Att’y Gen., S.C., at 2 (Dec. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/279907-doj-south-carolina-voting.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z66A-5UU5] (“In other words, according to the state’s data, which compare the 
available data in the state’s voter registration database with the available data in the state’s DMV database, 
minority registered voters were nearly 20% more likely to lack DMV-issued ID than white registered 
voters, and thus to be effectively disenfranchised by Act R54’s new requirements.”); Letter from Thomas 
E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Keith Ingram, Dir. of Elections, 
Elections Div., Office of the Tex. Sec’y of State, at 3 (Mar. 12, 2012), available at https:// 
www.documentcloud.org/documents/324586-justice-departments-decision-on-the-texas-voter.html 
[https://perma.cc/KRH5-XKHP] (“[A]ccording to the state’s own data, a Hispanic registered voter is at 
least 46.5 percent, and potentially 120.0 percent, more likely than a non-Hispanic registered voter to lack 
this identification.”). 
77 CAROL ANDERSON, ONE PERSON, NO VOTE: HOW VOTER SUPPRESSION IS DESTROYING OUR 
DEMOCRACY 75–81 (2018).  
78 ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT: THE MODERN STRUGGLE FOR VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA 
262–63 (2015).  
79 Id. at 269; WENDY WEISER & MAX FELDMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE STATE OF 
VOTING 2018, at 7 (2018). 
80 BERMAN, supra note 78, at 261.  
81 See generally ERIC FONER, FREEDOM’S LAWMAKERS: A DIRECTORY OF BLACK OFFICEHOLDERS 
DURING RECONSTRUCTION, at xi (Louisiana Paperback ed. 1996) (providing a comprehensive directory 
of the over 1,500 African Americans who held political office in the South during the Reconstruction 
Era). 
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enfranchisement was followed by two stages of voter suppression targeting 
African Americans and later other poor White voters. Beginning in the 
1870s, white violence and intimidation targeted black voters and other 
supporters of the Republican Party with the goal of deterring them from 
voting and giving the Democratic Party an advantage in elections.82 The 
Democratic Party reinforced this partisan advantage achieved by violence 
and intimidation by using fraud and manipulation of the ballot box.83 Both 
sets of tactics allowed the Democratic Party to regain control of all the state 
legislatures in the former Confederate states by the mid-1870s.84 
But even in this era of violence and fraud, African Americans continued 
to be a political force in the South.85 An opening remained for partisan rivals 
of the Democratic Party to create class-based alliances between poor Whites, 
who had been politically subordinated by Democrats (and other party elites) 
during and after the slavery era, and African Americans seeking to defend 
themselves from the reimposition of systemic racial subordination at the 
heart of the Democratic Party ideology.86 
The threat of a cross-racial class coalition led to the second stage of 
voter suppression for partisan advantage in the 1890s. First Independents, 
then Populists, began to mobilize lower class Whites and African Americans 
to win elections.87 The Populist coalition pushed the Democrats out of power 
temporarily in North Carolina, Virginia, and Tennessee, won legislative 
seats in most Southern states, and closely contested statewide offices in 
several of the states.88 In some states, Democrats were only able to turn back 
Populist challenges through fraud and manipulation at the ballot box.89 Under 
threat of federal intervention to stop Democratic fraud and ballot box 
 
82 See, e.g., Laughlin McDonald et al., Georgia, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT 
OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965–1990, at 67, 68 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994); 
Frank R. Parker et al., Mississippi, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, supra, at 136, 137; Robert 
Brischetto et al., Texas, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, supra, at 233, 235. 
83 J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880–1910, at 17–18 (1974); McDonald et al., supra note 
82, at 68. 
84 MICHAEL PERMAN, STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY: DISFRANCHISEMENT IN THE SOUTH, 1888–1908,  
at 9–10 (2001) 
85 See STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944–1969, at 7 (1976) 
(describing how African Americans in the South “continued to exercise the franchise and to hold public 
office in the 1880s and 1890s”).  
86 See Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523, 535 
(1973) (describing the ongoing political threat that African Americans posed to Democratic hegemony in 
1890).  
87 KOUSSER, supra note 83, at 25–26. 
88 Id. at 26; PERMAN, supra note 84, at 32.  
89 PERMAN, supra note 84, at 32 (describing how massive electoral fraud by Democrats was 
necessary to prevent the Populist coalition from winning control of the legislature).  
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manipulation, the African American threat to partisan advantage became 
even more salient.90 
States started to look to Mississippi and South Carolina as examples for 
how to suppress the minority vote without being subject to federal legislative 
and judicial interventions: through residence requirements for voting, poll 
taxes, and literacy and understanding tests.91 Other Democratic-controlled 
state legislatures followed suit by adopting similar types of voter suppression 
laws including White-only primary elections and expanded felon 
disfranchisement laws that targeted crimes for which African Americans 
were more likely to be accused and convicted.92 The result was Democratic 
Party hegemony in the South that would remain essentially unchallenged 
until the 1960s.93 
Thus the new and old voter suppression do bear this important 
similarity: both had partisan electoral advantage as their effect and goal. The 
old voter suppression helped restore Democratic Party hegemony in the 
South following Reconstruction. The new voter suppression has not yet had 
this widespread electoral effect, but it has arguably helped Republican 
candidates win closely contested elections throughout the nation. But in a 
critical other respect overlooked by those who rely on the analogy, the 
strategies diverge. The old voter suppression involved the effective 
disfranchisement of an entire class of voters that the new voter suppression 
is nowhere near achieving. 
B. Where the Analogy Fails 
The ideology of white supremacy was at the core of the post-Civil War 
Democratic Party. In their virulent opposition to the Fifteenth Amendment, 
Democratic congressmen repeatedly proclaimed, “[T]his is a white man’s 
 
90 KOUSSER, supra note 83, at 29–30 (describing the failed federal Lodge Bill, which would have 
required federal “supervision of all phases of registration and voting in national elections, and in effect 
nullifying certain practices and laws that facilitated fraud and disfranchisement”). 
91 See Orville Vernon Burton et al., South Carolina, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, supra 
note 82, at 191, 193 (describing the South Carolina Eight Box Law and its racially discriminatory effect 
on voting); Parker et al., supra note 82, at 137 (describing Mississippi’s adoption of a cumulative poll tax 
and literacy requirements for voting during its constitutional convention in 1890). 
92 See, e.g., DARLENE CLARK HINE, BLACK VICTORY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE PRIMARY 
IN TEXAS 69–94 (new ed. 2003) (describing the adoption and use of white primaries throughout the South 
as a tool to deprive African Americans of all influence in elections); JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER 
UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 41–68 (2006) 
(describing the racially discriminatory origins of felon disfranchisement).  
93 KOUSSER, supra note 83, at 224–37 (describing the transition from multi-party democracy to 
single-party oligarchy in the South at the beginning of the twentieth century); Merle Black & Earl Black, 
Deep South Politics: The Enduring Racial Division in National Elections, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF SOUTHERN POLITICS 401, 404 (Charles S. Bullock III & Mark J. Rozell eds., 2012) (“From the 
beginning of the twentieth century until the 1964 elections, every member of the U.S. Senate and House 
of Representatives from the Deep South was a Democrat.”). 
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government.”94 Democrats tried to rally support for their white supremacy 
vision of government (and opposition to the Fifteenth Amendment) by 
advancing racist claims about the competency and capability of African 
Americans to engage in the project of self-government.95 The Democrats also 
tried to stoke fear amongst Whites in the South with predictions of retribution 
from African Americans if they were given the opportunity to rule.96 
The campaign against the Fifteenth Amendment ultimately failed, but 
white supremacist ideology remained as a motivating force underlying the 
old voter suppression. Democrats used white supremacy as a means to bridge 
the class divides between Whites in the South and to secure white support 
and involvement in programs of voter suppression, designed not merely to 
achieve partisan electoral advantage but also the effective disfranchisement 
of African Americans as a class.97 
In the two post-Reconstruction stages of disfranchisement, Democrats 
constructed bogeymen designed to rally unified white support for voter 
suppression. The first bogeyman, “Negro rule,” was constructed in response 
to the African American enfranchisement and officeholding of the brief 
Reconstruction period.98 Feeding into the broad southern white fear of 
political subordination to African Americans—something southern Whites 
deemed a realistic prospect given the number of African Americans in the 
South—Democrats encouraged the violence and intimidation targeting 
Black voters that was a central feature of the first stage of voter suppression.99 
Democrats proved unable to effectively disfranchise African Americans, but 
it was not for lack of effort or desire. The resilience of African Americans 
and southern fear of the return of northern supervision or control over the 
 
94 This Democratic Party mantra during the debate over the Reconstruction was famously captured 
in a political cartoon by Thomas Nast in the Harper’s Weekly depicting three white men representing the 
three wings of the Democratic Party with their feet on the back and head of a black man lying face down 
grasping an American flag, representing his newly granted constitutional rights. Thomas Nast, This Is a 
White Man’s Government, HARPER’S WEEKLY, Sept. 5, 1868, at 568, available at 
https://blackhistory.harpweek.com/7Illustrations/Reconstruction/ThisIsAWhiteMansGov.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9C9F-SM6M]. 
95 See, e.g., PERMAN, supra note 84, at 22 (quoting Mississippi Senator James Z. George’s public 
statement about the great problem of black suffrage published in the Vicksburg Commercial Herald 
asserting that African Americans “though possessing many virtues and many excellent qualities, have 
never yet developed the slightest capacity to create, to operate, or to preserve constitutional institutions”). 
The Senator’s view about “‘the great problem’ . . . was neither remarkable nor unusual. It was widely 
shared.” Id. at 22–23.  
96 See ERNEST MCPHERSON LANDER, JR., A HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1865–1960, at 40 (1970) 
(describing the role of Ben Tillman, Governor and later Senator of South Carolina, in propagating a fear 
of Negro rule to secure support for voter suppression measures that disfranchised African Americans and 
poor Whites).  
97 PERMAN, supra note 84, at 27.  
98 LAWSON, supra note 85, at 10; PERMAN, supra note 84, at 22–24.  
99 LAWSON, supra note 85, at 11. 
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South functioned as barriers to effective disfranchisement.100 But the 
violence and intimidation combined with fraud and manipulation at the ballot 
box did reduce the black officeholding that the Democrats associated with 
“Negro rule.”101 
The Democratic Party and other white supremacists in the South, 
however, did not give up on the cause of black disfranchisement. When 
“Negro rule” faded as a plausible description of political reality in the mid-
1870s after Democrats gained control over all Southern state legislatures, 
Democrats constructed a new bogeyman, “Negro domination.”102 According 
to this account, African Americans posed a domination threat so long as they 
could vote and be mobilized by rivals to the Democratic Party.103 Democrats 
used this fear of “Negro domination” to weaken the cross-class Black–White 
coalition that underpinned support for the Independents and the Populists in 
the 1880s and 1890s and to ultimately secure the necessary support for the 
legal devices used to suppress the vote.104 
Once the Democrats gained political support for the second stage of 
voter suppression through law, they set as their goal the complete eradication 
of the political threat posed by African American voters.105 The cumulative 
poll taxes, literacy and understanding tests, white primaries, felon 
disfranchisement laws, grandfather clauses and other legal vehicles did just 
that as they reduced black voter registration and voting to a level where 
Blacks could not exercise any influence over elections or secure any 
representation in the political process.106 
The new voter suppression is distinct from the old insofar as it does not 
disfranchise entire groups. Though racism likely plays a role in these voter 
suppression efforts, the evidence indicates that partisan electoral advantage 
 
100 See, e.g., Peyton McCrary et al., Alabama, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, supra note 82, 
at 38, 42 (“The likelihood of federal intervention [after the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments] 
prevented the Democrats from simply disfranchising blacks and made it necessary to find alternative 
methods of assuring white supremacy.”). 
101 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877 (Henry 
Steele Commager & Richard B. Harris eds., updated ed. 2014). 
102 LAWSON, supra note 85, at 10; PERMAN, supra note 84, at 22–24.  
103 PERMAN, supra note 84, at 24.  
104 Id.; see also LAWSON, supra note 85, at 10 (“[T]he spectre of ‘[Negro] domination’ succeeded 
[as] [t]he obsession with white supremacy replaced the preoccupation with economic issues . . . .”).  
105 See BLACK & BLACK, supra note 93, at 402 (“To achieve these goals [of Negro subordination and 
insulation against external interference with local affairs], southern white men in the 1890s and early 
1900s combined violence and new requirements for voter registration (primarily poll taxes and/or tests 
of literacy and ‘understanding’) to expel virtually all black men from the electorate.”) 
106 See LAWSON, supra note 85, at 14–15 (describing the reduction of the black electorate in states 
throughout the South after 1900).  
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is the overriding motivation and the narrower effects of these newer tools.107 
In fact, the new voter suppression tools have not come remotely close to 
disfranchising an entire class of citizens. The laws have had only a minor 
effect on turnout when compared to the effect of the old voter suppression 
tools. Hajnal et al.’s nationwide study, which found the largest negative 
turnout effect from strict voter ID laws, still only found a statistically 
significant negative turnout effect from these laws in general elections for 
one of the four racial minority groups: Latinos.108 Although only a few 
studies measure the effects of other new voter suppression tools such as voter 
roll purges, the reduction or suspension of early voting, restrictions on 
registration drives, or citizenship proof requirements for voting on the 
turnout of the targeted groups, those studies suggest a negative turnout effect 
but not nearly at the level of effectively excluding entire groups of voters.109 
Differences in costs imposed on potential voters can explain the 
distinctive disfranchising effects of the old and new voter suppression tools. 
Whereas the old suppression tools imposed impossible-to-surmount costs on 
African Americans who sought to vote, the new voter suppression tools 
impose much lower costs that racial minorities and the poor can overcome. 
A recognition of that reality is not meant to condone voter ID laws or any of 
the other new voter suppression tools, nor to dismiss their effects as barriers 
to voting for the many people who cannot afford the costs of a photo ID or 
are discriminatorily purged from voter rolls. We fully agree that denial of the 
vote to anyone is a democratic harm that should be unacceptable in any self-
governing republic. Instead, our goal is to shine a light on something that the 
analogy between the old and new voter suppression unintentionally 
obscures. 
 
107 See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 78, at 255 (quoting racist statements from the sponsor of the Texas 
voter ID law in support of the law); see also supra note 3 (identifying direct and circumstantial evidence 
of the partisan motivation behind state voter ID laws).  
108 See Hajnal et al., supra note 3, at 368–71 (finding that strict voter ID laws had a statistically 
negative effect only for Latinos in general elections). The study did, however, find that strict voter ID 
laws had a statistically significant effect for African Americans, Latinos, and Asian-Americans in primary 
elections. Id. These findings raise the question of whether something other than voter ID laws and the 
other variables contained in the model is influencing the turnout decision. 
109 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 51, at 48–49 (finding a 3.7% and 1.5% 
decline in African American turnout from the 2008 to the 2012 general elections in Kansas and Tennessee, 
respectively, after the two states imposed citizenship requirements for voting—the highest turnout drop 
for any racial minority group); Adam J. Berinsky, The Perverse Consequences of Electoral Reform in the 
United States, 33 AM. POL. RES. 471, 480–82 (2005) (finding from a review of scholarship that higher 
propensity voters took much more advantage of early voting, absentee voting, and internet voting than 
lower propensity voters, which suggests that the reduction or elimination of convenience voting would 
not have a large turnout effect on lower propensity voters). 
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C. What the Analogy Masks 
There is an entire class of citizens that has been effectively 
disfranchised: the poor. In one important respect, the poor are similarly 
situated to African Americans in the South after the adoption of legal voter 
suppression tools during the redemption period. The poor’s turnout numbers 
have been reduced to such a low level that the poor do not influence 
elections. As recent empirical studies have shown, elected actors do not 
respond to the poor’s interests through the political process.110 That, for us, 
is the definition of effective disfranchisement, and it undermines our 
democracy. 
In the 2016 presidential election, there was, according to the United 
States Census, a 30% reported turnout gap between the wealthy and the 
poor.111 The gap might lead one to ask whether the new voter suppression 
laws, like the old, are effectively disfranchising the poor, who are most 
vulnerable to increases in the tangible costs of voting. But turnout data from 
elections preceding the recent spate of voter suppression laws suggest 
otherwise. For example, in the 2004 presidential election, the last 
presidential election before Indiana and Georgia became the first states to 
require photo IDs to vote in elections, the reported turnout gap between the 
rich and poor in the U.S. Census was actually higher than it was in 2016.112 
In fact, a 25% to 35% gap in reported turnout between the highest and lowest 
income classes categorized in the U.S. Census has persisted since the census 
started collecting voting data by income in 1964.113 
 
110 Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and the 
Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 368–70 (2016) (finding that legislators were less likely to support 
antipoverty legislation in districts with large poor populations); see also Ross, supra note 15, at 1132–35 
(describing the decline in redistributive policies and protections for lower income and working-class 
people in the United States over the past forty years); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political 
Powerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527, 1577–79 (2015) (summarizing the empirical literature on policy 
nonresponsiveness to the poor).  
111 Specifically, 80.3% of citizens who earned more than $150,000 voted in 2016 as compared to 
48.5% of citizens who earned less than $30,000. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 7. 
112 The reported turnout gap between the richest 20% of American citizens and the poorest 20% was 
40.3% in 2004 and 33.8% in 2016. Id. (2016 data); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION 
IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2004: TABLE 8 (2004), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2004/demo/ 
voting-and-registration/p20-556.html [https://perma.cc/3C5N-7TV2] (reporting 2004 data). 
113 See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE 
AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 153 (2012) (reporting a similar gap through 
2008); Jan E. Leighley & Jonathan Nagler, Socioeconomic Class Bias in Turnout, 1964–1988: The Voters 
Remain the Same, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 725, 728 tbl.1 (1992) (reporting consistent gap between 25%–
35% from 1964–1988).  
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FIGURE 1: AVERAGE FEDERAL ELECTION TURNOUT BY INCOME, 2006–2016a 
a Average turnout in federal elections between 2006 and 2016 by equally sized income quintiles and 
the status of voter ID laws in the voter’s state. Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study 
(CCES) validated voter file. 
To illustrate why we think this gap is one of the most pressing and 
overlooked voting rights issues of our time, we use the Cooperative 
Congressional Election Study (CCES) validated voter file to plot the average 
turnout of individuals in five equally sized income quintiles between 2006 
and 2016 (these quintiles do not correspond with the U.S. Census income 
class categories, which explains the relatively smaller turnout gap between 
the highest and lowest income quintile in the CCES data). In Figure 1, we 
plot turnout by status of voter ID laws in the voter’s state (strict ID versus no 
strict ID) and election type (primary versus general). 
As Figure 1 indicates, income is a much stronger predictor of turnout 
than presence of strict voter ID laws. Turnout is never more than 2% lower 
in states with strict voter ID laws compared to states with no strict ID 
requirements. In fact, for some income groups the turnout in states with strict 
ID laws was higher than in states with no strict ID laws.114 On the other hand, 
there is a 3% to 6% turnout gap between each income quintile, and the 
difference between turnout in the highest quintile (those who earn 
approximately $70,000 or more) and the lowest quintile (those who earn less 
 
114 A recent study of turnout in Rhode Island found differential effects before and after the state’s 
2014 photo ID law, specifically that turnout increased by an estimated 3.7% among high socioeconomic 
status registered voters in midterm elections. Francesco Maria Esposito et al., Effects of Photo ID Laws 
on Registration and Turnout: Evidence from Rhode Island 30 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 25503) (Jan. 2019), http://www.nber.org/papers/w25503 [https://perma.cc/G9U2-FDDR]. 
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than approximately $20,000) is 19% to 20%.115 Furthermore, the income gap 
exists in states with and without strict voter ID laws, suggesting that strict ID 
laws are not driving the income turnout gap. Thus, the fixation of voting 
rights advocates and democracy scholars on new voter suppression as the 
voting rights issue of our time misses a much larger disparity. 
In Figure 2 we plot the relative disproportionality of turnout by income 
quintiles. If turnout is equally distributed across all five income groups, then 
each group would contribute 20% of the total votes. Instead, as the figure 
illustrates, those in the poorest quintile contribute nearly five percentage 
points (or 21%) less than expected to the overall vote, compared to those in 
the wealthiest quintile who contribute three percentage points (or 15%) more 
than expected. The large deviation between the highest and lowest income 
quintile raises serious questions about whether income inequality in the 
United States undermines the principle of one-person, one-vote.116 In 
Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme Court held that “[f]ull and effective 
participation by all citizens in state government requires . . . that each citizen 
have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state 
legislature.”117 In the context of apportionment and districting, the Court has, 
as a rule of thumb, tolerated deviations between the most populous and least 
populous state and local districts of up to 10%.118 Following the Court’s logic 
in the malapportionment cases, the “income quintile deviation” (percentage 
overrepresentation of the upper quintile minus the percentage 
underrepresentation of the bottom quintile) is 36%, suggesting that the next 
battle for the Reynolds ideal of an “equally effective voice” might be waged 
over poverty and turnout.119 We also note that the “new voter suppression” 
 
115 Ethan Kaplan, Election Law and Political Economy, ECON. FOR INCLUSIVE PROSPERITY 1  
(Jan. 2019), https://econfip.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/5.Election-Law-and-Political-Economy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GN9Y-J9NT] (“Those earning more than $150,000 per year vote at a 50% higher rate 
in presidential elections and at a 100% higher rate in midterm elections than those making less than $5,000 
per year.”). 
116 The Supreme Court interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as a guarantee of the one-person, one-
vote standard in apportionment in a series of cases during the 1960s. See Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 
474, 484–85 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17–
18 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 391 (1963). 
117 377 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added). 
118 Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983) (“Our decisions have established, as a general 
matter, that an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10% falls within [a] 
category of minor deviations. A plan with larger disparities in population, however, creates a prima facie 
case of discrimination and therefore must be justified by the State.” (internal citations omitted)). While 
the Court has required near perfect population equality in congressional districts, it presumptively accepts 
deviations up to 10% in state and local districts due to their smaller district sizes, geographic constraints, 
a commitment to compactness, contiguity, and enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. See id. at 842.  
119 Note that the 36% “income quintile deviation” is much larger than deviations in turnout by race 
(15%–16% less turnout among Hispanic, Black, and Asian voters compared to White voters) and  
gender (7% less turnout among women). See Shiro Kuriwaki, Cumulative CCES Common Content  
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does not account for this disparity. In fact, the income quintile deviation is 
smaller in states with strict voter ID laws than in states with no strict ID laws. 
If the new voter suppression only weakly (if at all) accounts for the 
persistent turnout disparity between the rich and the poor, then what does 
account for it? To answer this question, we need to move beyond the 
theoretical approach to voting that is embedded in legal scholarship and 
advocacy. In the next part, we use social scientists’ recent work to broaden 
our understanding of the factors that drive voting and keep the poor away 
from the polls. 
FIGURE 2: RELATIVE TURNOUT DISPROPORTIONS BY INCOMEb 
b Relative disproportionality in turnout by equally sized income quintiles and the status of voter ID laws 
in the voter’s state. Source: Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) validated voter file (2006–
2016). 
II. TOWARD A DEEPER THEORETICAL ACCOUNT OF VOTING 
When it comes to voting barriers, a large disjuncture has emerged 
between what legal experts target and what social scientists conclude 
matters. A central focal point for legal scholars and lawyers is state-imposed 
legal barriers to voting and their impact on racial minorities.120 Yet legal 
experts have completely ignored the sources, or even the very existence, of 
the effective disfranchisement of the poor. While social scientists devote 
 
(2006–2018), HARV. DATAVERSE (Apr. 29, 2019), https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/II2DB6  
[https://perma.cc/UTL9-UAYT]. 
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considerable energy to examining the effect of legal barriers on racial 
minority voting,121 they also study impediments to voting that affect other 
groups as well, such as the poor.122 Their broadened focus relies on theories 
of voting that go beyond tangible obstacles like voter ID laws. 
For social scientists informed by rational choice and sociological 
theories of voting, voting depends on a panoply of factors beyond overt 
barriers.123 Voters’ ability to access information and their connections to 
other politically active individuals are much more central determinants of 
voting than the tangible costs.124 In this Part, we provide a deeper theoretical 
account of voting than typically advanced by legal scholars as a foundation 
for a more nuanced understanding of the sources of disfranchisement. We 
then relate these theories and their empirical implications to the effective 
disfranchisement of the poor. 
A. Rational Choice Theory 
Voting is not a deeply theorized subject in law. When barriers to voting 
fail to fully explain people’s decision not to vote, there is no alternative 
theoretical account in legal scholarship or advocacy. Instead, legal scholars 
and advocates cycle from one generation to the next of voting rights 
challenges—from vote denial (the first generation of barriers) to vote 
dilution (second generation) to election administration (third generation)—
without developing a full theoretical account explaining why people do or 
do not vote.125 Understanding the decision to vote, we argue, is key to all 
three generations of voting rights challenges, which all share the goal of a 
more inclusive democracy. 
Rational choice theory advances our understanding of the determinants 
of voting beyond tangible costs. Legal scholars are certainly not oblivious to 
rational choice theory. Anthony Downs, the principal progenitor of the 
 
121 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
122 See, e.g., BARTELS, supra note 6, at 260–65; GILENS, supra note 6; Kim Quaile Hill et al., Lower-
Class Mobilization and Policy Linkage in the U.S. States, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 75, 83 (1995) (finding a 
“positive relationship between lower-class mobilization and state welfare policy”); Elizbeth Rigby & 
Gerald C. Wright, Political Parties and Representation of the Poor in the American States, 57 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 552, 553 (2013) (examining the responsiveness of state political parties to the preferences of 
individuals from varied income backgrounds during the initial stages of policymaking). 
123 See infra notes 132–136 and accompanying text. 
124 See infra note 137.  
125 See, e.g., Gilda R. Daniels, A Vote Delayed Is a Vote Denied: A Preemptive Approach to 
Eliminating Election Administration Legislation that Disenfranchises Unwanted Voters, 47 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 57, 66–69 (2008); Brandon Haase, Guaranteeing the Right to Vote for Twenty-First 
Century America, 43 J. LEGIS. 240, 244 (2016); Dale E. Ho, Building an Umbrella in a Rainstorm: The 
New Vote Denial Litigation Since Shelby County, 127 YALE L.J.F. 799, 800–02 (2018); Daniel P. Tokaji, 
The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the New Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 
691–92 (2006).  
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theory, has been much cited and discussed in the legal literature.126 But when 
it comes to voting, legal scholars tend to narrowly focus on the paradox of 
voting that rational choice theorists have thus far failed to resolve within the 
theory itself—the question of why anyone bothers to vote when the likely 
impact of any individual vote on election outcomes is essentially nil.127 
Rational choice posits three factors relevant to an individual’s decision 
to invest, or vote: the benefits from voting, the costs to voting, and the 
probability that the individual’s vote will be decisive in an election.128 In this 
“calculus of voting,” even relatively trivial costs of voting, such as making a 
trip to the polls—let alone the much higher information costs—are likely to 
exceed any benefit from voting multiplied by the probability of casting a 
decisive vote. It is therefore irrational for anyone to vote. And yet, 
paradoxically, millions and millions of Americans vote in elections every 
year.129 
This paradox, and the lack of clear resolution of this paradox, has 
contributed to legal scholars’ dismissive treatment of rational choice 
theory.130 We argue, however, that legal scholars have been too quick to 
dismiss the theory. Even if rational choice theory is unable to explain why 
people vote in the first place, it provides important insights into voting 
determinants on the margin. It may be that the baseline decision to vote is 
motivated by factors that are inconsistent with the premises of the theory, 
 
126 Anthony Downs’s seminal work from 1957 that serves as the starting point for rational choice 
theory, An Economic Theory of Democracy, infra note 128, has been cited in some 796 law review articles 
to date according to a Hein Online search. 
127 See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The 
Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 
1752 & n.38 (2008) (citing Downs but narrowly focusing on the paradox of voting); Richard L. Hasen, 
Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2138–42 (1996) (engaging in the most expansive analysis 
of the paradox of voting in the legal literature); Jason Marisam, Voter Turnout: From Cost to 
Cooperation, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 190, 205–06 (2009) (describing the rational choice model and the 
paradox of voting). 
128 ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 38–45 (1957). In a later article, 
William Riker and Professor Peter Ordeshook construct a calculus of voting that relates the three factors 
in the following formula: R = PB – C. R is the return to the individual for voting (R) and this return is 
derived from the probability of casting a decisive vote (P) multiplied by the investment benefit from 
voting (B) minus the costs to voting (C). William H. Riker & Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory of the 
Calculus of Voting, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 25, 25 (1968). A paradox arises from the fact that the 
probability of casting a decisive vote in any large election is infinitesimally small. See Andrew Gelman 
et al., What Is the Probability Your Vote Will Make a Difference?, 50 ECON. INQUIRY 321, 323–24 (2012) 
(estimating that the probability of casting the pivotal vote in a presidential election (accounting for the 
probability that one lives in a state whose Electoral College vote will be pivotal) is approximately 1 in 60 
million, or “at most, 1 in 10 million in a few states near the national median”). As a result, the interaction 
term (PB) will also be infinitesimally small. 
129 See Timothy J. Feddersen, Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting, 18 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 99, 99 (2004). 
130 See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 127, at 2146 (“Rational choice theory seems best suited to explaining 
voting on the margin only, by examining how changes in costs (the C term) affect turnout.”); Marisam, 
supra note 127, at 205 (“The rational choice model holds limited predictive value for voter turnout.”). 
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such as consumption benefits from voting related to satisfying a sense of 
civic duty or the desire to maintain a democracy.131 But rational choice theory 
can still contribute to our understanding of the sources of variation in turnout 
that have been mostly overlooked in the legal literature. In particular, rational 
choice theory identifies two voting determinants—information and formal 
organizational affiliation—that, we argue later in this Part, are unevenly 
distributed and help explain the socioeconomic class-based participatory 
inequality that is the focal point of this Article. 
One of the critical insights from rational choice theory is the importance 
of information to voting.132 For example, Downs recognized uncertainty as a 
central feature of the basic logic of voting, which affects all three variables 
in the calculus of voting.133 First, uncertainty influences an individual’s 
assessment of the benefits from voting. When looking backward, individuals 
face uncertainty about what the incumbent, as part of the government, has 
done or could be doing to increase their well-being.134 Individuals are also 
uncertain about the differences between what candidates will do in the future 
and how those differences might impact their well-being.135 Individuals 
unable to differentiate between candidates in terms of their well-being should 
 
131 See DOWNS, supra note 128, at 246 (arguing that the paradox of voting can be resolved once we 
recognize that “rational citizens want democracy to work well so as to gain its benefits”). Riker & 
Ordeshook, supra note 128, at 25, include terms to capture both investment value (utility derived from 
contributing to the outcome of an election) and consumption value (utility derived from the act of voting 
itself) in their calculus of voting, but do not develop a strong basis for distinguishing between the two. 
More recent literature on the ethics of voting has developed a stronger theory about voting as an 
expression of values and a signal of beliefs. See, e.g., GEOFFREY BRENNAN & LOREN LOMASKY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DECISION: THE PURE THEORY OF ELECTORAL PREFERENCE 32–53 (1993) (establishing 
a model of electoral behavior where voting is a primarily expressive act); Loren E. Lomasky & Geoffrey 
Brennan, Is There a Duty to Vote?, 17 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 62, 82 (2000) (arguing that “[o]f all the 
rationales for a duty to vote, we find the expressive account strongest”); Alexander A. Schuessler, 
Expressive Voting, 12 RATIONALITY & SOC. 87, 90 (2000) (explaining how the utility from voting should 
be conceptualized as “being versus doing”).  
132 In addition to Anthony Downs, who focuses extensively on information as a critical determinant 
of voting, see DOWNS, supra note 128, at 207–46, an information theory of voting has emerged as a 
central component in the rational choice account of voting. See, e.g., Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang 
Pesendorfer, Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences, 93 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 381, 381 (1999) (“We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for abstention and show how 
the level of abstention depends upon the information environment.”); Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang 
Pesendorfer, The Swing Voter’s Curse, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 408, 409 (1996) (“Our contribution here is to 
demonstrate that informational asymmetries may also influence both participation and vote choice 
independent of costs to vote and pivot probabilities.”); John G. Matsusaka, Explaining Voter Turnout 
Patterns: An Information Theory, 84 PUB. CHOICE 91, 93 (1995) (“The main insight of the model is that 
even if people believe it is their duty to vote, rational citizens abstain if they feel unable to evaluate the 
choices.”); Joseph McMurray, The Paradox of Information and Voter Turnout, 165 PUB. CHOICE 13, 15 
(2015) (“[T]he empirical importance of information favors a view of voting somehow as instrumental, 
rather than as an end in itself.”). 
133 DOWNS, supra note 128, at 77–82. 
134 Id. at 80. 
135 Id. 
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be less likely to vote because there would be no recognizable benefit from 
voting. 
Second, uncertainty also impacts individuals’ perceptions about their 
probability of casting a decisive vote. While it is infinitesimally rare for any 
individual to cast a decisive vote, studies have shown that individuals’ 
perceptions about the closeness of an election can influence their decisions 
to vote.136 Those who do not know the closeness of the election may be less 
likely to vote. Finally, uncertainty about the logistics of voting can also 
influence the decision to vote. Individuals who are uncertain about where to 
vote, how much time it will take to vote, when to vote, and what is required 
in order to vote are less likely to vote.137 
Information can reduce or even eliminate uncertainty about the benefits 
of voting, perceptions about the closeness of elections, and the process of 
voting. A stream of free (or close to free) and broadly available information 
can dramatically reduce uncertainty about whether one’s vote might be 
decisive. Television, radio, newspapers, and the Internet provide the public 
with a broad sense of the anticipated closeness of elections.138 Such 
information requires little processing time or background knowledge and is 
therefore presumably more easily incorporated by individuals across all 
classes into their calculus of voting. 
 
136 For early research showing strong correlations between electoral competitiveness and turnout, 
see generally ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960); THOMAS R. DYE, POLITICS, 
ECONOMICS, AND THE PUBLIC: POLICY OUTCOMES IN THE AMERICAN STATES (Aaron Wildavsky ed., 
1966); WILLIAM H. FLANIGAN, POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE 34–36 (2d ed. 
1972); Lester W. Milbrath, Individuals and Government, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 27 (Herbert Jacob & Kenneth N. Vines eds., 2d ed. 1971). 
More recent studies note that the correlation between turnout and competitive elections is strongest 
in single-member districts, Daniel Stockemer, When Do Close Elections Matter for Higher Turnout? 
Gauging the Impact of the Interaction Between Electoral Competitiveness and District Magnitude, 25 J. 
ELECTIONS PUB. OPINION & PARTIES 178, 190 (2015), and when voters perceive elections to be close, 
Leonardo Bursztyn et al., Polls, the Press, and Political Participation: The Effects of Anticipated Election 
Closeness on Voter Turnout 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23490, 2018) (“We 
find that greater exposure to only the incidental reporting on close polls is associated with greater turnout 
as well.”). 
Increased mobilization may also drive turnout in close elections. See generally Gary W. Cox & 
Michael C. Munger, Closeness, Expenditures, and Turnout in the 1982 U.S. House Elections, 83 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 217 (1989). 
137 See Henry E. Brady & John E. McNulty, Turning Out to Vote: The Costs of Finding and Getting 
to the Polling Place, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 115, 116 (2011) (finding that turnout decreased when 
polling places were moved, and that “the impact of the search effect is about two and one-half times larger 
than the transportation effect”); see also Jesse Yoder, How Polling Place Changes Reduce Turnout: 
Evidence from Administrative Data in North Carolina 16 (May 30, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
a=3178184 [https://perma.cc/DG3E-SF2Z] (finding that turnout decreases when polling places are moved 
to new locations, and that “the majority of the decline in turnout induced by polling place changes can be 
attributed to the search costs associated with finding a new polling place rather than travel costs”). 
138 See John H. Aldrich, Rational Choice and Turnout, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 246, 260 (1993) 
(explaining that there is typically “a lot of information about the expected closeness of two-candidate 
presidential elections, and it is relatively easy to process that information”). 
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When it comes to the costs of voting, the same sources provide mostly 
free information about when to vote, but not necessarily how, where, and 
what is required to vote. Parties and nonprofit groups’ get-out-the-vote 
(GOTV) efforts serve as important vehicles for filling this information gap 
through mailings, phone calls, and door-to-door canvassing.139 As with 
information about the closeness of the election, such logistical information 
necessitates little processing time or background knowledge. As a result, to 
the extent that individuals receive such information, they are able to build 
more certainty about the costs of voting into their voting calculus and, in 
doing so, will often see these costs as quite low. 
The biggest informational challenge for individuals comes in assessing 
the tangible benefits from voting. To do so, they must have a sense of the 
differences between candidates and parties and how these differences might 
impact their well-being.140 In a perfect world with costless information, 
Downs explains, the potential voter would first need to “examine all phases 
of government action to find out where the two parties would behave 
differently.”141 Second, she would need to “discover how each difference 
would affect h[er] utility income.”142 And third, she would have to “aggregate 
the differences in utility and arrive at a net figure which shows by how much 
one party would be better than the other.”143 These are enormous 
informational requirements for any individual. Because we do not live in a 
world of costless information, most voters take shortcuts to ascertain party 
differentials.144 But even these shortcuts, which might involve comparing 
 
139 See, e.g., Sample Get-Out-the-Vote Email and Phone Scripts, LEAGUE WOMEN VOTERS, 
https://www.lwv.org/league-management/elections-tools/sample-get-out-vote-email-and-phone-scripts 
[https://perma.cc/H93Q-YQNJ] (providing contacted persons with logistical information about voting). 
140 Seven years prior to the publication of DOWNS, supra note 128, the American Political Science 
Association published the findings of a four-year study by the organization’s Committee on Political 
Parties. The Committee argued that the platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties were so 
similar that voters could not distinguish between them. See Committee on Pol. Parties, Am. Pol. Sci. 
Ass’n, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties, 
44 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 3–4 (1950) (“Alternatives between the parties are defined so badly that it is 
often difficult to determine what the election has decided even in broadest terms.”). More recent literature 
suggests that modern partisan polarization has both increased turnout, see Alan I. Abramowitz & Walter 
J. Stone, The Bush Effect: Polarization, Turnout, and Activism in the 2004 Presidential Election, 36 PRES. 
STUD. Q. 141, 142 (2006) (finding that George W. Bush was “the most polarizing presidential candidate 
in recent political history and that this was the main reason turnout and activism increased dramatically 
in 2004”), and increased more informed voting, see Douglas R. Pierce & Richard R. Lau, Polarization 
and Correct Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections, 60 ELECTORAL STUD. 1, 9 (2019) (finding that 
“polarization contributes to our democracy by increasing the likelihood that people vote correctly”). 
141 DOWNS, supra note 128, at 45. 
142 Id. Utility income refers to the benefits of voting, or the satisfaction of choosing one particular 
candidate/party over another. 
143 Id. 
144 See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Voting with Cues, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1011, 1023–24 (2003) 
(“Political scientists and cognitive psychologists have worked to identify the shortcuts or heuristics that 
ordinary citizens can use to vote competently, that is, to vote with limited information as they would if 
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candidates’ policy platforms, public positions, or personal backgrounds, 
require a nontrivial amount of information, not to mention the time and 
capacity to process such information.145 
There is both indirect and direct empirical evidence suggesting the 
importance of information to voting decisions. The indirect evidence arises 
from the strong correlation between educational attainment and voting, 
which makes sense from the perspective of rational choice theory.146 
Education generally enhances the capacity of individuals to process 
information. And, in some cases, education provides individuals with greater 
background knowledge about policy and politics which makes it easier to 
ascertain the candidate or party differentials critical to determining the 
benefits from voting.147 
More direct evidence can be found in correlational studies, finding a 
relationship between information and voting, and in experimental studies, 
 
they had full information.”); Martin Gilens & Naomi Murakawa, Elite Cues and Political Decision 
Making, 6 RES. IN MICROPOLITICS 15, 42 (2002) (“But decision-making heuristics seem to offer a less 
demanding alternative by which citizens can form meaningful policy preferences.”); Michael S. Kang, 
Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and 
“Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1141, 1150 (2003) (“Political scientists have shown that when 
deciding for whom to vote in candidate elections, the typical voter refers to the heuristic cue of party 
identification to figure out which candidate is most likely to match her values and share her interests.”). 
145 Shortcuts may also be less reliable in state and local elections. See Christopher S. Elmendorf & 
David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, Political Parties, and Election Law, 2013 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 363, 367 (arguing that traditional heuristics may be ineffective at the state and local level “not 
simply because voters pay less attention to these elections. It is also because our system of election law 
does not provide voters in these elections with on-ballot voting cues of comparable quality to the party 
labels used in national elections.”). 
146 See, e.g., RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 34 (1980) (finding 
in their seminal study that “[c]itizens with a college degree are 38 percent more likely to vote than are 
people with fewer than five years of schooling”). 
Subsequent studies have found similarly strong correlations between educational attainment and 
turnout. See, e.g., Thomas S. Dee, Are There Civic Returns to Education?, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1697, 1704 
(2004) (estimating that college entrance increases the probability of voting in the last year by 26%); Karl-
Oskar Lindgren et al., Enhancing Electoral Equality: Can Education Compensate for Family Background 
Differences in Voting Participation?, 113 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 108, 120 (2019) (finding after studying 
Swedish education reforms of the 1990s that increased education has a particularly strong effect on the 
turnout of students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds); Alexander K. Mayer, Does Education 
Increase Political Participation?, 73 J. POL. 633, 640 (2011) (estimating that postsecondary education 
advancement increases turnout by 18%); Kevin Milligan et al., Does Education Improve Citizenship? 
Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1667, 1678–81 (2004) 
(finding that U.S. high school graduates are 25.6% more likely to vote after controlling for race, gender, 
and birth effects and that exogenous increases in (compulsory) education increased turnout).  
147 See, e.g., SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 514 (1995) (“Educated citizens are much more likely to be informed about politics and tolerant 
of unpopular opinions.”); Ronald La Due Lake & Robert Huckfeldt, Social Capital, Social Networks, and 
Political Participation, 19 POL. PSYCHOL. 567, 568 (1998) (“Well-educated citizens are more likely to 
possess a knowledge base that makes it easier to unravel the intricacies of the political process, and they 
are more likely to possess the cognitive skills that make it easier to absorb and process complex political 
information.”).  
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suggesting a causal effect of information on voting.148 The findings from 
these studies are consistent with a general observation that turnout is much 
higher in higher information elections (such as presidential elections) than in 
lower information elections (such as city council elections), even though the 
probability that an individual could cast a decisive vote is much higher in the 
latter than the former (precisely because turnout is so low).149 It is difficult to 
disentangle whether and to what degree information about the costs, 
perception of electoral closeness, or the benefits from electing a candidate is 
driving the decision to vote. But it seems clear that information matters quite 
a bit to the voting calculus. Thus, understanding how information is 
distributed can provide an important key to understanding turnout variations 
between groups. 
Within rational choice theory, a second source of turnout variation can 
be derived from the context in which voters operate, including the formal 
organizations to which people belong.150 If we understand elections to be 
contests between formal organizations or groups rather than atomistic 
individuals, then the rational choice calculus of voting might predict positive 
 
148 See, e.g., Valentino Larcinese, Does Political Knowledge Increase Turnout? Evidence from the 
1997 British General Election, 131 PUB. CHOICE 387, 405 (2007) (finding that information is not only “a 
good predictor of turnout, but also that it raises voter participation in a clearly causal fashion”); David 
Dreyer Lassen, The Effect of Information on Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 49 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 103, 113 (2005) (finding a 20% average treatment effect of being informed on the propensity 
to vote); Thomas R. Palfrey & Keith T. Poole, The Relationship Between Information, Ideology, and 
Voting Behavior, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 511, 526 (1987) (finding a positive relationship between the level 
of information that an individual holds and the probability of voting); Martin P. Wattenberg et al., How 
Voting Is like an SAT Test: An Analysis of American Voter Rolloff, 28 AM. POL. Q. 234, 246–47 (2000) 
(showing that voters’ lack of information in lower ballot races to be the most statistically significant 
variable predicting “rolloff,” or the non-completion of a ballot). 
149 Compare e.g., Voter Turnout, U.S. ELECTION PROJ., http://www.electproject.org/home/voter-
turnout/voter-turnout-data [https://perma.cc/2TWQ-24TQ] (offering nationwide voter turnout data and 
finding approximately 60% of the voting eligible population has voted in presidential-year general 
elections since 2004), with Official Total of Central and Polling Place Results, CITY HARTFORD, 
http://www.hartford.gov/images/registrar/hartford_results_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/UL5C-DG9K] 
(reporting less than 5% of Hartford, Connecticut’s population voted in the 2013 school board election), 
and Erik Bojnansky, What If They Held an Election and Nobody Came?, BISCAYNE TIMES (Dec. 2013), 
http://www.biscaynetimes.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1647 
[https://perma.cc/SK5A-GCAA] (reporting turnout was less than 11% in a runoff election for District 5 
of the Miami City Council in 2013), and In Iowa, a Special Election Has Historic Low Turnout, NPR 
(Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/08/07/541969289/in-iowa-a-special-election-has-historic-
low-turnout [https://perma.cc/RZH6-PQ3U] (reporting not a single person voted in the 2017 special 
election in McIntyre, Iowa to decide the term length of the mayor and city council). 
150 Rebecca B. Morton, Groups in Rational Turnout Models, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 758 (1991); Carole 
Jean Uhlaner, Political Participation, Rational Actors, and Rationality: A New Approach, 7 POL. 
PSYCHOL. 551 (1986) [hereinafter Uhlaner, Political Participation]; Carole J. Uhlaner, Rational Turnout: 
The Neglected Role of Groups, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 390 (1989) [hereinafter Uhlaner, Rational Turnout];  
Carole Jean Uhlaner, “Relational Goods” and Participation: Incorporating Sociability into a Theory of 
Rational Action, 62 PUB. CHOICE 253 (1989) [hereinafter Uhlaner, Relational Goods]. 
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turnout.151 Since there are many fewer groups than individuals, the 
probability that a group of individuals will cast a decisive vote is no longer 
infinitesimal and, depending on the election and how many groups are 
actively involved, the probability could actually be quite high. 
Group leaders further incentivize group members to vote in three ways. 
First, groups inform their members of the benefits from voting by showing 
how the candidates differ and how these differences relate to the group’s 
(and therefore its members’) utility incomes.152 Second, group leaders 
provide their members with selective benefits for voting, such as the 
satisfaction of sharing an identity with others.153 And third, group leaders can 
create a sense that there is a duty as a member of the group to vote.154 Group 
leaders can then leverage the potential voting power of the group to secure 
policy concessions from candidates that will bring their policy platforms 
closer to the group’s preferences.155 
This group-based variation of rational choice theory thus introduces the 
possibility that individuals might vary in the intangible benefits they derive 
from voting, such as satisfying the sense of duty to vote. Prior rational choice 
scholars had only identified such benefits as an explanation for why people 
might vote even when the calculus of voting suggested it would be 
irrational.156 However, they never assessed whether and why those benefits 
from voting might be unevenly distributed. If the sense of duty to vote makes 
a person more likely to vote, then the uneven distribution of that potential 
benefit will contribute to variations in turnout. Political scientists have 
argued that these variations might not be random, but rather the product of 
differences in formal organizational affiliations that are correlated with one’s 
class status.157 
 
151 See Uhlaner, Political Participation, supra note 150, at 565 (“Although the vote of any one group 
member could rarely change an election outcome, the votes of many members well might.”); Uhlaner, 
Rational Turnout, supra note 150, at 419 (“[I]ndividuals do not behave atomistically within the political 
sphere but rather are joined with others in groups with shared interests.”).  
152 See Jan Leighley, Group Membership and the Mobilization of Political Participation, 58 J. POL. 
447, 447 (1996) (“Organizations . . . subsidize the costs of political information for members and may 
therefore promote broader involvement in the political system.”).  
153 Uhlaner, Political Participation, supra note 150, at 562. Professor Uhlaner refers to goods derived 
from belonging to a group as relational goods. These goods, which include “‘social approval,’ solidarity, 
a ‘desire to experience one’s history,’ friendship and its benefits, the desire to be recognized or accepted 
by others, the desire to maintain an identity, other aspects of sociability, and some instances of fulfillment 
of a duty or moral norm,” can positively influence an individual’s turnout decision. Uhlaner, Relational 
Goods, supra note 150, at 255 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).  
154 Uhlaner, Political Participation, supra note 150, at 562. 
155 Id. at 560.  
156 See sources cited supra note 131. 
157 See infra notes 173–175 and accompanying text. 
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Some empirical evidence supports the group-based rational choice 
model. For example, those who belong to formal organizations like unions 
are approximately 8% more likely to vote than nonmembers,158 and those 
who attend church are approximately 15% more likely to vote than those 
who do not.159 Studies thus far have failed to clearly identify the mechanism 
driving this variation. The positive relationship between turnout and formal 
organizational affiliation could be explained by voters’ greater ability to 
obtain information, selective benefits, or an enhanced sense of duty from 
such groups. Alternatively, it might be explained by other characteristics of 
the individuals that belong to these organizations that are not accounted for 
in empirical studies. 
In sum, it may be that rational choice theory cannot provide a persuasive 
explanation for why people vote at all. But it offers potentially helpful clues 
for why some people might vote more than others by extending its focus 
beyond the tangible costs of voting that occupy the legal literature. Empirical 
evidence suggests that variations in the possession and capacity to process 
information contribute to variations in voting. While the empirical evidence 
for the group-based rational choice model is not yet as robust, that model 
introduces variations in the intangible benefits from voting as another 
plausible account for why some people vote more than others. 
B. Sociological Theories of Voting 
Legal scholars have only engaged shallowly with rational choice 
theories; their engagement with sociological theories of voting is even more 
slight.160 As with the rational choice theories of voting, the tangible costs of 
voting that are central to legal voting rights claims are a relatively 
 
158 See John Thomas Delaney et al., Unionism and Voter Turnout, 9 J. LAB. RES. 221, 230 (1988) 
(reporting turnout is 8.3% higher among union members than nonmembers); Richard B. Freeman, What 
Do Unions Do . . . To Voting?, 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9992, 2003) 
(finding that turnout is 10 to 13 points higher among union members than nonmembers, though the 
difference shrinks to about 4% when controlling for demographic characteristics of union members). 
159 Alan S. Gerber et al., Does Church Attendance Cause People to Vote? Using Blue Laws’ Repeal 
to Estimate the Effect of Religiosity on Voter Turnout, 46 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 481, 481 (2016) (“[T]hose 
who report attending church weekly are between 10 and 15 percentage points more likely to vote.”); see 
also STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 273–75 tbl.D-1 (1993) (using ANES data to measure turnout among 
churchgoers, controlling for various demographic and geographic variables); SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., 
supra note 147 (presenting similar results using both ANES data and responses to the 1990 Citizen 
Participation Survey). 
160 Professor Richard Hasen is the one scholar we found in the law review literature that gave deep 
and sustained attention to sociological theories of voting in an article he wrote over twenty years ago. See 
generally Hasen, supra note 127. The foundational books for the sociological theory of voting from the 
mid-twentieth century, Voting and The People’s Choice, have been cited by 123 and 120 law review 
articles, respectively. BERNARD R. BERELSON ET AL., VOTING: A STUDY OF OPINION FORMATION IN A 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN (1954); PAUL F. LAZARSFELD ET AL., THE PEOPLE’S CHOICE: HOW THE VOTER 
MAKES UP HIS MIND IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN (3d ed. 1968). 
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unimportant voting determinant under the sociological theories of voting.161 
But unlike rational choice theories of voting, the sociological theories do not 
view voting as an individualistic decision.162 Sociologists instead emphasize 
the interdependent nature of the decision to vote. The central determinants 
of voting in the sociological theories are the social networks to which the 
individual belongs, which are rooted in the social context surrounding the 
individual. 
In the 1940s and 1950s, sociologists from the Columbia School of 
Sociology initiated two in-depth studies of voting behavior that were among 
the first to ever be conducted. Both found that voting is a social decision. In 
The People’s Choice, the authors of a study of Erie County, Ohio, residents’ 
voting behavior concluded that “voting is essentially a group experience. 
People who work or live or play together are likely to vote for the same 
candidates.”163 In Voting, a study of voting behavior in Elmira, New York, 
the sociologists came to a similar conclusion, explaining that “[t]he 
individual’s vote is the product of a number of social conditions or 
influences.”164 They found that the groups that matter to individuals’ vote 
choices include the family, socioeconomic and ethnic affiliations, personal 
associations, and formal membership associations.165 Such social networks 
influence vote choice through internal communications about politics and 
their members’ reliance on the opinions and vote choices of others, 
particularly opinion leaders, within the network.166 
Later sociological work drawing from these early studies theorized that 
social networks not only influence how one votes, but also the very decision 
 
161 Most sociological theories do not incorporate the tangible costs of voting into their models. The 
one exception is a recent study by Professor Meredith Rolfe, who treated institutional costs as a factor of 
secondary relevance in her model. MEREDITH ROLFE, VOTER TURNOUT: A SOCIAL THEORY OF 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 101–06 (2012) (advancing a conditional voting decision model in which the 
individual turnout decision depends on social context and offering a theory of socially interdependent 
voting behavior).  
162 See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 200 (1960) 
(“Even if people are not aware of a personal stake in the electoral decision, they may still be induced to 
vote by social pressures and inner feelings of social obligation.”); Katherine Haenschen, Social Pressure 
on Social Media: Using Facebook Status Updates to Increase Voter Turnout, 66 J. COMM. 542, 558 
(2016) (arguing that personal networks create a “flow of voter action, not just information”); R. Robert 
Huckfeldt, Political Participation and the Neighborhood Social Context, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 579 (1979) 
(discussing the connection between higher social status and greater political participation); David Knoke, 
Networks of Political Action: Toward Theory Construction, 68 SOC. FORCES 1041, 1054 (1990) (“[T]he 
more often people discuss politics with their intimates, the more they participate in the various electoral 
activities.”); Jan E. Leighley, Social Interaction and Contextual Influences on Political Participation, 
18 AM. POL. Q. 459, 472 (1990) (“[A]ggregate measures of social context as well as characteristics of 
individuals’ social interaction influence their likelihood of participation.”). 
163 LAZARSFELD ET AL., supra note 160, at 137. 
164 BERELSON ET AL., supra note 160, at 37. 
165 Id. at 46–52, 88–98.  
166 Id. at 102–08.  
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to vote.167 Within social networks, political information that is relevant to the 
decision to vote is shared.168 Social networks also construct norms about 
voting that can be enforced through social sanctions.169 
Sociologists have found that variations in turnout are related to 
differences in the composition of social networks. On the one hand, social 
networks comprising politically interested individuals will share political 
information with each other and construct group norms that voting is a social 
obligation or a civic duty.170 Individuals in these networks seeking to avoid 
social disapproval, or even ostracization, are thought to engage in imitative 
behavior, leading to turnout cascades within social networks.171 
On the other hand, social networks comprising individuals who are 
indifferent to politics or worse might construct a norm of nonvoting that 
leads to social disapproval or ostracization for those who do vote. The result 
is abstention cascades in which imitative behavior within the social networks 
contributes to the widespread abstention of members in the network.172 
The composition of social networks, and particularly the extent to 
which they include politically interested people, has been found to be related 
to the individual’s social and neighborhood context.173 Family, friends, 
coworkers, neighbors, and comembers of associations like unions or 
churches are the primary components of networks. These networks tend to 
be characterized by high degrees of homophily on a broad array of 
 
167 See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
168 Scott D. McClurg, Social Networks and Political Participation: The Role of Social Interaction in 
Explaining Political Participation, 56 POL. RES. Q. 449, 450 (2003) (advancing the social network model 
of participation in which information is shared between members of the social network). 
169 See e.g., Stephen Knack, Civic Norms, Social Sanctions, and Voter Turnout, 4 RATIONALITY & 
SOC’Y 133, 137–38 (1992) (“Social sanctions . . . permit a certain amount of ‘substitutability’ of feelings 
of duty, as someone with a low sense of civic obligation may nonetheless vote to avoid displeasing a 
friend or relative with a stronger sense of [civic] duty.”). 
170 See, e.g., La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, supra note 147, at 579 (finding a positive relationship 
between political expertise in a network and the likelihood of political participation and between the 
frequency of political interaction within the network and the likelihood of participation).  
171 See James H. Fowler, Turnout in a Small World, in THE SOCIAL LOGIC OF POLITICS: PERSONAL 
NETWORKS AS CONTEXTS FOR POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 269, 270–72 (Alan S. Zuckerman ed., 2005).  
172 Id. at 272. Another feature of social networks found to influence turnout decisions is the partisan 
heterogeneity of the network; the more that persons within the network have differing political views, the 
less likely that members of the network vote. Diana C. Mutz, The Consequences of Cross-Cutting 
Networks for Political Participation, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 838, 844 (2002). 
173 See Robert Huckfeldt & John Sprague, Discussant Effects on Vote Choice: Intimacy, Structure, 
and Interdependence, 53 J. POL. 122, 123 (1991) (“[T]he family has been widely recognized as a 
preeminent agent of social influence with long-lasting political consequences.”); Huckfeldt, supra note 
162, at 589–90 (finding “that the neighborhood social context can influence both (1) the extent of the 
individual participation and (2) the relationship between participation and individual social status”); 
Bruce C. Straits, The Social Context of Voter Turnout, 54 PUB. OPINION Q. 64, 64 (1990) (“A voter’s 
family, friends, and coworkers serve as bridges to larger networks of social relations which provide access 
to the information and resources that stimulate political interest and provide an informed basis for making 
ballot choices.” (citation omitted)).  
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sociodemographic characteristics related to the propensity to vote.174 That 
internal similarity, to the extent that it manifests in similar voting patterns 
among demographically similar communities, in turn leads to substantial 
turnout gaps between particular communities.175 
C. Theories of Voting and Socioeconomic Class Turnout Disparities 
Rational choice and sociological theories of voting introduce additional 
determinants of voting that have been mostly overlooked in the legal 
literature. Once we add information costs, membership in formal 
organizations, and inclusion within social networks of politically interested 
individuals as determinants of voting, a more plausible account of the turnout 
disparity between the rich and poor emerges. 
First, the costs of obtaining the information necessary to ascertain the 
benefits from voting are not evenly distributed across socioeconomic classes. 
Educational attainment, which tends to enhance the cognitive skills 
necessary to process and use information relevant to determining the benefits 
from voting, is positively correlated with income.176 Higher economic status 
individuals tend to be better educated and therefore typically better able to 
ascertain the benefits from voting than lower economic status individuals.177 
The need for, and the cost of, information thus contributes to socioeconomic 
class disparities in turnout. 
Second, class-based differences in formal organizational affiliation are 
another likely contributor to class-based turnout disparities. Formal 
organizational affiliation positively influences turnout, and the poor belong 
to fewer such organizations than other socioeconomic classes.178 As a result, 
the poor are less likely than others to receive information from formal 
organizational group leaders about the benefits from voting, selective 
economic benefits to voting, or intangible benefits such as a sense of duty to 
vote that can arise from such affiliations. 
 
174 See Miller McPherson et al., Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks, 27 ANN. REV. 
SOC. 415, 431–33 (2001).  
175 See McClurg, supra note 168, at 451 (attributing the socioeconomic-based participation gap to 
the differences in the social resources and social networks of low and high status communities).  
176 See, e.g., David Card, The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings, in 3A HANDBOOK OF LABOR 
ECONOMICS 1801, 1809 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (reviewing empirical studies and 
finding a consistent and positive effect of education on earnings). 
177 See, e.g., Lassen, supra note 148, at 114 (“[T]he finding that education increases the probability 
of being informed suggests that education may influence voting indirectly, possibly by lowering the costs 
of information processing.”).  
178 See La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, supra note 147, at 575 (finding from a regression of organizational 
membership on demographic characteristics that “[a]s people earn more income, attain higher levels of 
education, become employed, and get older, they report joining more organizations”).  
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Differences in the composition of social networks are a third contributor 
to socioeconomic turnout disparities that has been overlooked in law. The 
poor vote less and, due to the sociodemographic homophily of social 
networks, they are more likely to be part of social networks with other people 
who vote less and have little interest in politics.179 Abstention cascades, rather 
than turnout cascades, are therefore more likely to be a feature of the poor’s 
social networks. 
Empirical findings provide strong suggestive evidence that it is the 
aggregation of these three determinants of voting—information costs, formal 
organizational affiliation, and social networks—and not the tangible costs of 
voting that explain much of the income-class based disparities in voting.180 
The question then arises: What can be done to reduce such disparities? In the 
next Part, we first acknowledge the likely limits of law in responding to 
social and class-based sources of disparities. We then turn to another 
contributing factor, the mobilization activities of political parties. At present, 
campaigns exacerbate the political exclusion of the poor through what we 
label passive voter suppression. That offers another potential route for law’s 
interventions: changing campaigns’ incentives regarding mobilization. 
III. UNDERSTANDING PASSIVE VOTER SUPPRESSION 
When tangible cost barriers are the primary source of turnout 
disparities, law provides a clear solution. Most tangible barriers, such as 
registration or voting requirements, are state creations and can therefore be 
eliminated or ameliorated by legislatures or courts. But when the primary 
sources of turnout disparities are information costs, formal organizational 
affiliations, and the composition of social networks, then the potential legal 
interventions are either less readily identifiable or not politically viable, 
given the massive resources required. 
But another dynamic is at work, which can be addressed through law. 
Candidate and party mobilization activities are centrally important factors 
contributing to socioeconomic class-based turnout disparities. In this Part, 
we examine how campaign mobilization activities interact with the three 
determinants of voting identified in social science theories to increase (and 
decrease) turnout. We then show how candidates and parties, using a 
calculus of contact to guide their mobilization activities, ignore the poor and 
 
179 Id. at 576 (finding a relationship between education and belonging to social networks of 
politically well-informed and interested individuals). 
180 See, e.g., Samuel Abrams et al., Informal Social Networks and Rational Voting, 41 BRIT. J. POL. 
SCI. 229, 237–40, 252–56 (2010) (advancing a social network model explaining various determinants of 
voting including income, education, student status, and age and providing empirical support for the 
model). 
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exacerbate socioeconomic turnout disparities, a phenomenon we label 
passive voter suppression. 
A. Political Mobilization and the Theories of Voting 
The political information necessary to reduce uncertainty about the 
benefits from voting is generally free. But such information differs in its 
accessibility and tailoring. Examples of broadly accessible free political 
information include campaign advertisements, television, and radio news.181 
These sources provide information, sometimes detailed information, about 
the candidates, their backgrounds, and their views on certain issues. The 
problem is that such sources of information are not usually tailored to a 
particular audience, which can make it difficult for potential voters to draw 
connections between the candidates’ policies and platforms and their own 
well-being. 
Political information obtained from members of social networks and 
formal organizations is both free and more tailored to the audience.182 When 
family, friends, coworkers, or members of associations discuss politics, they 
are more likely to discuss candidates, issues, and policies that are of interest 
to each other.183 Through these political conversations, members of social 
networks and formal organizations can obtain more tailored information 
conducive to differentiating between parties and candidates on matters 
relevant to the potential voters’ well-being. Such tailored information 
reduces both the cognitive skills and the time necessary for individuals to 
differentiate between parties and candidates and connect these differences to 
their own lives.184 
 
181 Although we note that campaigns are increasingly advertising on internet platforms, such as 
Facebook, YouTube, and email blasts, this natural migration to online undermines the “free”  
and “accessible” nature of many campaign advertisements because access to the Internet is stratified  
by socioeconomic status. See Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Pew Res. Ctr., Americans’ Internet 
Access: 2000–2015, PEW RES. CTR. 6 (June 26, 2015), https://www.pewinternet.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/9/2015/06/2015-06-26_internet-usage-across-demographics-discover_FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GJ7G-AL7J] (“Adults living in households with an annual income of at least $75,000 a 
year are the most likely to use the internet, with 97% of adults in this group currently reporting they are 
internet users. Those living in households with an annual income under $30,000 a year are less likely to 
report internet usage, with 74% of adults doing so now . . . [, and] . . . [t]hose with college educations are 
more likely than those who do not have high school diplomas to use the internet.”). 
182 See ROBERT HUCKFELDT & JOHN SPRAGUE, CITIZENS, POLITICS, AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION: 
INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE IN AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN 14 (1995) (noting that socially obtained 
information is more efficient because it “comes tailor-made”). 
183 See id. (“If a citizen wants to know about the current status of nuclear arms-reductions talks, he 
may or may not find relevant information in the newspaper or on the television news, but he can formulate 
an explicit informational request to an associate who might know.”).  
184 See id. (explaining that citizens in a social network “can request information from people who, 
based on their joint history in some common context, are known to have general viewpoints similar to 
their own”).  
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This tailored, free information is only accessible to members of social 
networks and formal organizations. Those who either are in social networks 
with little political activity or who are unaffiliated with politically active 
formal associations tend to receive less tailored political information.185 
These individuals often must resort to the free information, like the media, 
that require greater cognitive skills and time to process and use. 
Campaigns offer another free source of information that can be tailored 
to the potential voter. During election season, campaigns reach potential 
voters by sending mailers, calling, and meeting in person through door-to-
door canvassing. Their goal is to mobilize individuals to vote for their 
candidate and they often do so by providing individuals with information 
about the candidate and her positions.186 The most effective campaigns gather 
information about individuals and seek to tailor information about the 
candidate and positions in a way that draws a connection between supporting 
the candidate and improving the contacted individuals’ lives.187 In doing so, 
campaigns subsidize information costs by reducing the cognitive skills and 
time necessary to process and use information necessary to differentiate 
between candidates and otherwise determine the benefits from voting.188 
Campaigns also indirectly provide tailored information to individuals 
they do not directly contact. They do so by providing leaders and members 
of formal organizations and social networks with tailored political 
information that they can share with other members of those organizations 
and networks.189 Sharing such information allows members to make more 
educated determinations about the differences between the candidates and 
how these differences might affect them. 
 
185 Campaigns are perhaps the important source of tailored information as they tend to focus few 
mobilization resources on individuals outside of politically relevant social networks and politically active 
formal associations. See infra Section III.D.  
186 See Robert Huckfeldt & John Sprague, Political Parties and Electoral Mobilization: Political 
Structure, Social Structure, and the Party Canvass, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 70, 70 (1992) (“When a party 
worker knocks on a citizen’s door, calls a citizen on the telephone, or affronts him with a yard sign, an 
effort is being made by one individual to provide information that will influence the behavior of another 
individual.”). 
187 See Kyle Endres & Kristin J. Kelly, Does Microtargeting Matter? Campaign Contact Strategies 
and Young Voters, 28 J. ELECTIONS PUB. OPINION & PARTIES 1, 4 (2017) (“Campaigns use data about 
the individual to deliver messages to the segments of the electorate who are thought to be the most 
receptive to their outreach based on their perceived partisanship and perceived issue positions.”).  
188 Kevin Arceneaux, Do Campaigns Help Voters Learn? A Cross-National Analysis, 36 BRIT. J. 
POL. SCI. 159, 160–61 (2006) (arguing that campaign information does not persuade voters to change 
their minds but helps them make decisions in line with their beliefs). 
189 HUCKFELDT & SPRAGUE, supra note 182, at 22 (“[P]artisan organizations heighten and extend 
the impact of the information they convey by carefully targeting their messages to particular locations 
within the social structure—locations that are likely to further the diffusion of their messages.”).  
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Beyond information, both the rational choice and sociological theories 
point to a sense of duty as a determinant of voting.190 This sense of duty can 
arise from affiliation with formal organizations and the desire for social 
rewards or the fear of social sanctions that are associated with individuals’ 
voting decisions.191 The sense of duty can also emanate from social networks 
where norms, imitative behavior, and a yearning to belong influence 
individuals’ voting decisions.192 Through their mobilization activities, 
campaigns can also convey to individuals, formal organizational leaders, and 
members of social networks that voting is an important civic responsibility. 
This sense of duty is often transmitted from organizational leaders to other 
members, as well as from one member of a social network to another.193 
Unfortunately, while the political information and sense of duty that 
campaigns provide directly to individuals and indirectly through formal 
organizations and social networks is free, it is not broadly accessible. 
Campaigns do not have the resources or inclination to contact everyone. 
Instead, what we label a calculus of contact leads to disparities in the 
distribution of tailored information. The resulting gaps have socioeconomic 
class dimensions and drive what we identify as passive voter suppression. In 
the rest of this Part, we elaborate on these points. But first, we contextualize 
the rising importance of campaign mobilization activities as a means to 
inform voters and provide them with a sense of duty to vote. 
B. The Rising Importance of Campaign Mobilization Activities 
The primary goal of campaigns is to win elections. Campaigns employ 
multifaceted strategies to secure the votes necessary to win elections. These 
strategies often involve some combination of encouraging supporters to go 
to the polls, persuading undecided individuals to vote favorably for the 
candidate, and discouraging opponents from turning out to vote.194 In 
deciding which strategy to pursue and the proper mix of the strategies, 
campaigns need to consider the costs and effectiveness of each.195 
 
190 See Uhlaner, Political Participation, supra note 150, at 562 and accompanying text.  
191 See supra note 170. 
192 See supra notes 154, 170 and accompanying text.  
193 See Uhlaner, Rational Turnout, supra note 150, at 391–92 (describing leaders of formal 
organizations as intermediaries between politicians and organizational members who can “use the group’s 
communications resources to mobilize members to vote by enhancing their sense of citizen duty by an 
appeal to group loyalty”).  
194 See Costas Panagopoulos, All About That Base: Changing Campaign Strategies in U.S. 
Presidential Elections, 22 PARTY POL. 179 (2016) (describing different presidential campaigns strategies 
over time).  
195 PAUL S. HERRNSON, CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGNING AT HOME AND IN 
WASHINGTON 202–26 (7th ed. 2016) (describing the strategic context of congressional campaigns).  
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Campaigns spend a major share of their budget on advertisements and 
voter mobilization. Television advertisements have been a central 
component of campaigns since the 1950s.196 Such advertisements cost less to 
reach a broader audience than door-to-door canvassing, which was the 
dominant way campaigns reached out to potential voters before the advent 
of television.197 Advertisements provided potential voters with information 
about the candidate’s background, past support for policies, and future policy 
proposals.198 Over time, campaigns increasingly have used attack or negative 
advertisements to disparage opponents, highlight opponents’ past support for 
policies disfavored by important segments of the electorate, and criticize 
opponents’ future policy proposals.199 
Campaigns have long viewed advertisements as an effective means of 
mobilizing supporters, converting the undecided, and discouraging 
opponents. But doubts emerged in the 1990s about the cost-effectiveness of 
ads.200 Although campaigns feared the possible electoral effects of a 
unilateral shift entirely away from advertisements, they began to experiment 
with directing more money to mobilization activities.201 
From the 1950s to the 1990s, mobilization activities remained constant 
as campaigns focused attention on advertisements. About 20% to 25% of the 
population reported that somebody from one of the political parties called or 
visited them during presidential elections from 1956 to 1992.202 Then two 
studies during the 1990s provided the impetus for greater campaign 
investments in mobilization activities.203 These studies involved the random 
selection of households to be contacted door-to-door, via phone calls, or 
through mailers, and then a comparison between the turnout of those 
 
196 See KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, PACKAGING THE PRESIDENCY: A HISTORY AND CRITICISM OF 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING 34 (3d ed. 1996). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 John G. Geer, The News Media and the Rise of Negativity in Presidential Campaigns, 45 PS: POL. 
SCI. & POL. 422, 422 & fig.1 (2012) (plotting the share of negative ads in presidential campaigns over 
time and finding that less than 10% of ads were negative in 1960 while more than 60% of ads were 
negative in 2008); see also DARRELL M. WEST, AIR WARS: TELEVISION ADVERTISING AND SOCIAL 
MEDIA IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 1952–2012, at 66 fig.4-2 (6th ed. 2014) (showing increase of negative 
ads as a percentage of total from 1952–2008). 
200 RASMUS KLEIS NIELSEN, GROUND WARS: PERSONALIZED COMMUNICATION IN POLITICAL 
CAMPAIGNS 18 (2012). 
201 Id. at 41–44.  
202 Time Series Cumulative Data File, Variable VCF9030 (1948–2016), AM.  
NAT’L ELECTION STUD., https://electionstudies.org/data-center/anes-time-series-cumulative-data-file 
[https://perma.cc/H3XB-PDGL] [hereinafter ANES]. 
203 See KLEIS NIELSEN, supra note 200, at 41–42 (describing the AFL-CIO’s experimentation and 
testing of the effects of mobilization activities on turnout during the 1998 midterm election); Alan S. 
Gerber & Donald P. Green, Does Canvassing Increase Voter Turnout? A Field Experiment, 96 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 10939 (1999). 
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contacted in the households “treated” with different forms of contact and the 
turnout of members of households not contacted in any of the three ways. 
The studies found a statistically significant and substantial effect of door-to-
door canvassing on turnout, but only a slight effect of mailers on turnout, and 
virtually no effect of phone calls on turnout.204 Subsequent studies found that 
more personalized phone calls that are interactive and responsive to 
questions and feedback had a more substantial effect on turnout than the 
more scripted calls used in the initial reported experiment.205 
Such findings regarding the positive impact of mobilization activities 
on turnout contrasted with subsequent research finding little to no turnout 
effect from television advertisements.206 One explanation for this difference 
is that mobilization activities are more personal. Whether in the form of a 
door knock or a phone call, they involve a personal interaction that cannot 
be replicated through a television advertisement. Campaigns gain two 
possible advantages from these more personal interactions. First, campaigns 
can tailor their message to the particular contacted person.207 Second, the 
 
204 See KLEIS NIELSEN, supra note 200, at 41–44, Gerber & Green, The Effects of Canvassing, supra 
note 21, at 661. 
205 See Nickerson, Volunteer Phone Calls Can Increase Turnout, supra note 21, at 271. Robocalls 
have been independently shown to be ineffective at mobilizing voters. See, e.g., Shang E. Ha & Dean S. 
Karlan, Get-Out-the-Vote Phone Calls: Does Quality Matter?, 37 AM. POL. RES. 353, 363 (2009) (“This 
finding suggests that although the number of interactions between callers and recipients matter, the 
message needs to be focused for a GOTV phone call to be effective.”); Ricardo Ramírez, Giving Voice 
to Latino Voters: A Field Experiment on the Effectiveness of a National Nonpartisan Mobilization Effort, 
601 ANNALS AM. ACAD. SOC. & POL. SCI. 66, 77 (2005) (“In two of the sites, the estimated effect of robo 
calls is positive, but the estimated effect is negative in the other three sites that employed robo calls. In 
no sites are the effects positive and statistically significant. Once again, this is not surprising, as other 
field experiments using automated calls have found them to be ineffective.”); Daron R. Shaw et al., Do 
Robotic Calls from Credible Sources Influence Voter Turnout or Vote Choice? Evidence from a 
Randomized Field Experiment, 11 J. POL. MARKETING 231, 231 (2012) (“Results suggest that the 
automated calls had weak and statistically insignificant effects on turnout and vote margins.”). But see 
Adam Zelizer, How Many Robocalls Are Too Many? Results from a Large-Scale Field Experiment, J. 
POL. MARKETING: ONLINE 1, 6 (2018) (“These results suggest that get-out-the-vote calls can cut through 
the noise in a busy electoral season, and that increased dosage [seven calls in eight days] may yield 
increased turnout.”).  
206 Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, The Minimal Persuasive Effects of Campaign Contact 
in General Elections: Evidence from 49 Field Experiments, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 148, 148 (2018) 
(estimating the effect of TV ads on candidate choice at zero). But see Michael M. Franz & Travis N. 
Ridout, Does Political Advertising Persuade?, 29 POL. BEHAVIOR 465, 486 (2007) (finding that the 
“complete advertising environment” that incorporates multiple exposure to ads during the 2004 general 
election had small effects on vote choice). 
207 In the past, campaigns were constrained from tailoring messages because of the lack of 
information they had about individuals prior to contacting them. But since the 2000 presidential election, 
campaigns have expanded the universe of information they have about potential voters. Data vendors 
collect and sell to campaigns individuals’ demographics, voting history, consumer preferences, and 
associational activities, among other details. Campaigns then use this information to target specific 
messages to potential voters that emphasize policy positions or candidate contrasts that are assumed most 
relevant to the individual based on the data collected about the individual. This message tailoring reduces 
the information costs of voting for contacted persons. 
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more personal forms of contact can create a stronger sense of social pressure 
to vote through an emphasis on voting as a civic duty or obligation to the 
community.208 
Campaign strategies shifted dramatically in response to these studies’ 
findings, which could be implemented using new data sources allowing voter 
contact to be more personalized and effective. The percentage of potential 
voters contacted by somebody from one of the political parties jumped more 
than 7% between the 1992 and 1996 election (from just 18.8% to 26%) and 
another 6% between the 1996 and 2000 election (from 26% to 32%). In the 
2004 election, parties contacted 43% of surveyed respondents. Since then, 
contact levels have remained consistently high from a historical 
perspective.209 Between 2006 and 2016, more than 65% of respondents to the 
Cooperative Congressional Election Study (n=249,627) reported that they 
had been contacted by a candidate for political office.210 
Although increased mobilization produces the democratic good of more 
participation, there is a downside. Over the past forty years, there has been a 
consistent and large disparity in campaigns’ contacts of different 
socioeconomic classes.211  Campaigns generally contact the poor much less 
than other socioeconomic classes.212 This disparity has continued as 
campaigns have placed more emphasis on mobilization activities, thereby 
exacerbating absolute differences between the number of poor people 
contacted as compared to the number of people from other socioeconomic 
classes. In the next Section, we identify the source of this contact disparity 
and show how it leads to the phenomenon of passive voter suppression. 
C. Strategic Mobilization and the Calculus of Contact 
Political campaigns’ new commitment to mobilization has not changed 
the fundamental reality that campaigns cannot mobilize everyone. 
Campaigns face a budget constraint that requires them to make choices about 
who to contact. Since the goal is to win elections, campaigns pursue cost-
 
208 See, e.g., LISA GARCÍA BEDOLLA & MELISSA R. MICHELSON, MOBILIZING INCLUSION: 
TRANSFORMING THE ELECTORATE THROUGH GET-OUT-THE-VOTE CAMPAIGNS 54 (2012) (arguing that 
the interpersonal sociocultural interaction associated with face-to-face canvassing leads the contacted 
person to have a greater “cognitive identification . . . with the political process”).  
209 ANES, supra note 202. 
210 For a visual representation of these data in Figure 4, see infra notes 211–212 and accompanying 
text. 
211 Between 1978 and 1994, the ANES asked respondents whether they were contacted by a political 
campaign. The gap in contact between the highest and lowest income quintiles ranged between 8% and 
19%, with an average gap of 13.6%. Between 2006 and 2014, the CCES asked respondents whether they 
were contacted by a political campaign. The gap between the highest and lowest income quintiles ranged 
between 15% and 28% with an average gap of 22.4%. See infra Figure 3. 
212 See infra Figure 4 (showing the income class-based disparity in contact since the late 1970s).  
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effective mobilization strategies that will maximize the number of votes 
gained per dollar spent.213 Such cost-effective mobilization requires 
campaigns to make strategic calculations about the benefits of contacting 
particular individuals and measure those benefits against the costs of 
mobilizing voters. 
We label this strategic calculation the calculus of contact. The calculus 
does not lead to a single mobilization method; instead, it identifies factors 
relevant to the mobilization decision that campaigns weigh and calculate 
differently. Contacting is rational when the benefits from such contact 
exceed the cost of such contact. Campaigns using the calculus of contact 
usually start from the aggregate and assess, on the basis of the electoral 
context, how many voters they will need to mobilize to win the election. 
They then use this aggregate assessment to choose between mobilization 
strategies that involve different probabilities related to securing a favorable 
vote from the contact. 
In the calculus of contact, there are two major costs associated with 
mobilization. First, campaigns must pay and train staff to contact individuals. 
Second, campaigns must pay for the data and technology necessary to 
implement a mobilization strategy. Campaigns use these data to improve 
their assessments of the probability that contacting an individual will yield 
benefits for the candidate. 
On the benefits side, campaigns seek favorable votes for their 
candidates by contacting potential voters. To predict benefits from contact, 
campaigns estimate the probability that an individual will vote in the election 
and the probability that the person will vote for their candidate.214 Campaigns 
also include in their predictions the probability that contacting a particular 
individual will lead to the indirect mobilization of others in the potential 
voter’s formal organization or social network. Campaigns target formal 
organizational leaders or social network members who share the campaigns’ 
message, and place social pressure to vote on others in the organization or 
network whom the campaign does not directly contact.215 
 
213 See, e.g., GREEN & GERBER, supra note 21, at 2 (offering “a guide for campaigns and 
organizations that seek to formulate cost-effective strategies for mobilizing voters”).  
214 See, e.g., Costas Panagopoulos & Peter W. Wielhouwer, The Ground War 2000–2004: Strategic 
Targeting in Grassroots Campaigns, 38 PRES. STUD. Q. 347, 350 (2008) (“Generally, findings confirm 
the notion that parties contact people predisposed to participate in politics and are members of their 
respective political coalitions.”).  
215 See STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 27 (1993) (“Political leaders [indirectly] mobilize citizens for political action 
through social networks.”); Scott D. McClurg, Indirect Mobilization: The Social Consequences of Party 
Contacts in an Election Campaign, 32 AM. POL. RES. 406, 418 (2004) (finding through an empirical 
analysis that “people who are contacted are more likely to engage in interpersonal mobilization”).  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
680 
There is one consistent feature that cuts across virtually all 
contemporary campaign mobilization strategies: the avoidance of 
unregistered, infrequent, and nonvoters.216 As we argue in the next Section, 
campaigns’ avoidance of these individuals introduces socioeconomic biases 
into mobilization strategies that ultimately result in the passive suppression 
of poor voters. 
D. Passive Voter Suppression 
Passive voter suppression is the suppression of votes that arises from 
parties’ and candidates’ neglect of, and inattention to, particular potential 
voters during an election campaign. In this Section, we show how passive 
voter suppression is related to campaigns’ calculus of contact. We theorize 
about how this calculus of contact has led parties and campaigns to 
disproportionately ignore the poor in their political outreach.  We then relate 
the rich–poor contact gap to the persistent rich–poor turnout gap. 
Campaigns applying the calculus of contact invariably try to avoid 
contacting two groups of potential voters. The first group includes known 
supporters of the opposing candidate. Contacting supporters of the opposing 
candidate is highly unlikely to secure a favorable vote for the candidate. And 
worse yet, contacting these individuals might contribute to their decision to 
vote for the opponent. In a relatively competitive election, it is unlikely that 
these potential voters will be completely ignored as the opposing candidate 
has strong electoral incentives to contact them. 
A second group includes those either not registered to vote or who 
infrequently or never vote. This group that we label “persistent nonvoters” 
raises two red flags within campaigns’ calculus of contact. First, given the 
positive relationship between past and future turnout behavior, the 
probability that contacting nonvoters will result in a vote is likely to be lower 
than that for more frequent voters.217 
Even if campaigns’ contact of persistent nonvoters resulted in votes, 
uncertainty about how they might vote creates a second reason for campaigns 
to avoid them. Without information about nonvoters’ partisan affiliation or 
preferences, which for regular voters might be included in a registration form 
 
216 See EITAN D. HERSH, HACKING THE ELECTORATE: HOW CAMPAIGNS PERCEIVE VOTERS 146–47 
(2015) (describing how contemporary mobilization strategies typically involve campaigns ignoring 
infrequent voters).  
217 See, e.g., Alexander Coppock & Donald P. Green, Is Voting Habit Forming? New Evidence from 
Experiments and Regression Discontinuities, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1044, 1060 (2016) (finding that 
“mobilizing 100 compliers today generates 50 more votes over the five federal elections in the decade to 
come”); Alan S. Gerber et al., Voting May Be Habit-Forming: Evidence from a Randomized Field 
Experiment, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 540, 545–46 (2003) (finding evidence through a field experiment that 
voting may be habit forming in that those who vote in past elections are more likely to vote in future 
elections). 
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or voting history indicating participation in one of the parties’ primaries, 
campaigns will not have any bases for predicting how past nonvoters might 
vote in the future. Mobilizing persistent nonvoters might not only activate a 
nonvoter who is a latent supporter of the opponent and lead her to vote for 
the opponent. It might also activate a network of latent supporters of the 
opponent and lead a group of people to vote for the opponent. That risk, when 
combined with the relatively low likelihood that the nonvoter would vote if 
contacted, leads campaigns to mostly ignore nonvoters in their mobilization 
activities. 
Campaigns have employed various mobilization strategies designed, in 
part, to avoid nonvoters. Prior to the 2000s, campaigns mostly relied on 
geographic precinct voting data to inform their mobilization strategies.218 
Campaigns used this data to focus their mobilization efforts on precincts with 
higher aggregate turnout and with favorable voting patterns for the 
candidate’s party.219 With the advent of better sources of data post-2000, the 
more well-funded campaigns used “microtargeting” tactics in which they 
were able to target specific households within precincts (and individuals 
within households) for mobilization.220 Microtargeting allowed for a more 
precise exclusion of nonvoters from the pool of people contacted. 
FIGURE 3: DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE CONTACT RATES IN OHIOc 
 
c Contact rates by the John Kerry presidential campaign (2004) and the Barack Obama presidential 
campaigns (2008 and 2012) in Ohio, by the partisanship and likelihood of voting of each target, as 
estimated by Catalist LLC. Source: Figure originally published in David W. Nickerson & Todd Rogers, 
Political Campaigns and Big Data, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 63 (2014). Copyright American Economic 
Association; reproduced with permission of the Journal of Economic Perspectives. 
David Nickerson and Todd Rogers recently published a heatmap 
(reprinted in Figure 3 above) of Democratic presidential campaign 
 
218 See KLEIS NIELSEN, supra note 200, at 144–45 (describing prior mobilization strategies that relied 
on precinct-based targeting of potential voters). 
219 HUCKFELDT & SPRAGUE, supra note 182, at 236–37 (describing evidence of such geographic 
based canvassing based on neighborhood or precinct voting data).  
220 See HERSH, supra note 216. 
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mobilization patterns in Ohio between 2004 and 2012 that shows how 
microtargeting has led to increasing disparities in contact between higher and 
lower propensity voters.221 In 2004, the presidential campaign of John Kerry 
relied mostly on a neighborhood precinct strategy that resulted in some 
disparities in contact between low and high propensity voters.222 In 2008, the 
campaign of Barack Obama shifted to a more microtargeted approach to 
mobilization,223 although the new approach did not lead to a dramatically 
different contact pattern as the Obama campaign devoted much more 
resources to mobilization activities overall, allowing it to extend its reach to 
more low propensity voters.224 But by 2012, President Obama’s campaign 
leaned heavily on a microtargeting mobilization strategy, and the result was 
a much larger disparity in contact between low and high propensity voters.225 
These low turnout voters that campaigns ignore are disproportionately 
individuals from lower socioeconomic classes. Data and analytics from 
vendors like Catalist both drive and reinforce campaigns’ tendency to ignore 
the poor. For campaigns using data vendors and their extensive collection of 
personal information, the goal is to improve the number of votes per dollar 
spent from mobilization activities.226 The figure below reveals how this cost-
effectiveness comes at a cost in terms of socioeconomic disparities in 
contact, showing the positive relationship between Catalist turnout 
predictions and potential voters’ income. Between 2008 and 2014, the 
predicted likelihood that an individual would turn out to vote increased with 
her income.227 
 
221 See David W. Nickerson & Todd Rogers, Political Campaigns and Big Data, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 
51, 63 & fig.1 (2014). 
222 Id. at 63 (describing the lack of reliance on predictive scores for targeting in the 2004 presidential 
campaign). 
223 Id. at 63–64 (explaining the shift to greater reliance on predictive scores for targeting in the 2008 
presidential campaign). 
224 Id. (finding that “[t]he highest concentrations of direct contacts were observed among citizens 
who were predicted to support Democratic candidates but who had low likelihoods of voting”). 
225 Id. at 64 (suggesting that presidential campaigns in 2012 “avoided communicating with citizens 
with the lowest turnout probabilities”). 
226 See HERSH, supra note 216, at 15–21 (describing the data vendors and the information that these 
data vendors sell to campaigns). 
227 Our data are from a one percent sample of Catalist’s national voter file (n=1,556,196). 
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FIGURE 4: ESTIMATED TURNOUT PROBABILITIES BY INCOME QUINTILEd 
 
d Distribution of the estimated probability that a registered voter will vote by five equally sized income 
quintiles. Source: Random sample of registered voters (n=1.5 million) in the national file maintained by 
Catalist LLC. 
Such predictions ultimately contribute to socioeconomic class biases in 
campaign contact. Data from the American National Election Studies 
(ANES) and the Cooperative Congressional Election Study help reveal the 
disparities in campaign contact of potential voters in the top and bottom 
income quintiles. The ANES data show a persistently large 7% to 17% rich–
poor contact gap between 1978 and 1994.228 According to the more recent 
CCES data, this gap has grown. Between 2006 and 2016, the rich–poor 
contact gap has ranged from 16% to 28%.229 
 
228 ANES, supra note 202. Our measure of the proportion of individuals contacted each year reflects 
any respondent to the ANES who answered “yes” to one of several questions about campaign contact. 
These questions are reflected in variables VCF0946a (contacted by incumbent), VCF0947a (contacted by 
challenger), VCF0948a (contacted by Democrat), VCF0949a (contacted by Republican) of the 
cumulative data file. The sample size is 18,069 spanning the election years 1978 to 1994. 
229 The CCES is a two-wave internet survey of a stratified national sample of 30,000 to 60,000 
individuals. The CCES has been administered during each election year since 2006 by the firm YouGov. 
A one-panel survey is also administered during non-election years. CCES respondents were asked 
whether a candidate or political campaign had contacted them during an election year on the 2006 
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FIGURE 5: SELF-REPORTED CONTACT STRATIFIED BY INCOMEe 
e
 Self-reported contact by candidates and/or political campaigns, stratified by income. Actual earnings 
are not coded uniformly across surveys. Income quintiles represent five equally sized groups of survey 
respondents in each year. Source: ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File (1978–1994) and the CCES 
Common Content (2006–2016). 
Particularly troubling is the fact that the rich–poor contact gap in 2010 
and 2014 represented the largest gap in any presidential or midterm election 
since the ANES started surveying people in 1978. This growing contact gap 
corresponds with campaigns’ increasing use of data and microtargeting 
mobilization strategies over the past decade.230 
Campaigns’ decisions to disproportionately ignore the poor in their 
mobilization activities appear to drive at least a part of the persistent rich–
poor turnout gap. According to experimental studies testing the causal effect 
of door-to-door canvassing on turnout, a campaign’s decision to contact an 
individual through door-to-door mobilization is predicted to increase their 
likelihood of voting by as much as 7% to 10%.231 Studies also estimate that 
campaigns’ more tailored phone call contact with potential voters increases 
 
The total sample size for these years is 249,627. Shiro Kuriwaki, Cumulative CCES Common Content 
(2006–2018), HARV. DATAVERSE, https://cces.gov.harvard.edu [https://perma.cc/5FU2-KZSG]. For 
information about the survey’s design and methodology, see Lynn Vavreck & Douglas Rivers, The 2006 
Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 18 J. ELECTIONS PUB. OPINION & PARTIES 355 (2008). 
230 See HERSH, supra note 216, at 147–50 (describing the increase use of microtargeting strategies 
by well-funded campaigns).  
231 Gerber & Green, The Effects of Canvassing, supra note 21, at 658 n.8; Green et al., Getting Out 
the Vote in Local Elections, supra note 21, at 1094. 
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turnout by 3% to 5%.232 Thus, when we multiply the socioeconomic class 
contact gap by the causal effect of canvassing and phone calls on turnout, we 
see that campaigns’ disproportionate orientation of mobilization activities 
away from the poor could account for approximately 10% of the 
approximately 30% turnout gap between the rich and poor.233 That effect 
accounts for far more of the turnout gap than the new voter suppression laws 
do.234 
The explanatory value of the socioeconomic bias in campaign contacts 
is greater when we incorporate the indirect mobilization effects from 
campaign contacts. Social scientists have found that voter contacts have a 
contagion effect on turnout among others in the network of the individual 
contacted.235 Another study by David Nickerson assesses the contagion effect 
of mobilization on turnout in two cities found that those who received a door-
to-door canvassing appeal to vote were 8.6% to 10.9% more likely to vote 
than the control groups.236 Beyond this direct mobilization effect, the study 
found that “[t]he treated person passed on 64% and 59% of the increased 
propensity to vote” onto the other person in the household in the two studied 
cities, respectively. 
This means that “a person who might be 25% likely to vote in the 
primary would become 85% likely to vote as a direct result of a cohabitant 
deciding to vote.” That is a huge effect, with the increase in likelihood of 
voting from contagion exceeding the socioeconomic turnout gap that existed 
at the time of the study in 2008 between persons with advanced degrees and 
persons with eighth grade educations, and between persons in households 
with less than $10,000 in income and persons in households earning more 
than $60,000. The study demonstrates that within households, at least, 
 
232 Melissa R. Michelson et al., Heeding the Call: The Effect of Targeted Two-Round Phone Banks 
on Voter Turnout, 71 J. POL. 1549, 1559 (2009) (finding that multiple phone calls to targeted likely voters 
increases turnout up to 10.3%); David W. Nickerson, Quality Is Job One: Professional and Volunteer 
Voter Mobilization Calls, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 269, 275 (2007) (finding that higher quality, more 
conversational phone calls to potential voters by professionals increased turnout by 3% at the national 
level and 5% at the local level); David W. Nickerson, Volunteer Phone Calls Can Increase Turnout: 
Evidence from Eight Field Experiments, 34 AM. POL. RES. 271, 283 (2006) (finding that volunteer phone 
banks increased turnout by 3.8%). 
233 In 2016, there was a 20% rich–poor contact gap. The cumulative effect of the two forms of 
mobilization on turnout (face-to-face and phone contact) is 15%. If we assume that the mobilization effect 
is cumulative and consistent across voters, the elimination of the rich–poor contact gap through a 20% 
increase in campaigns’ contact of the poor should increase poor turnout by 3% (0.15 × 0.20) and reduce 
the turnout gap from 30% to 27%. 
234 See supra Figure 1 (showing the relatively minor effect of voter ID laws on the rich–poor turnout 
gap); supra notes 114–115 and accompanying text (describing the relatively minor effect of voter ID laws 
as compared to income on the rich–poor turnout gap).  
235 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
236 Nickerson, supra note 16, at 54. The following discussion of this study is sourced from pages 53–
55 and Table 2. 
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“voting is a highly contagious behavior.” The contagion effect is likely to 
diminish somewhat moving from cohabitants to friends, neighbors, 
coworkers, and associates. But experimental research indicates that the 
contagion effect of mobilization persists within social networks.237 
Although it is difficult to quantify precisely, when we include the 
indirect mobilization effect on turnout, a conservative estimate of the effect 
of eliminating passive voter suppression is a further 2% to 3% reduction in 
the turnout gap. Thus, combining the direct and indirect mobilization effect 
of campaign contacts might reduce the rich–poor turnout gap by about 
15%.238 
In subsequent elections, there would be a persistent additive or even 
multiplier effect of the elimination of the socioeconomic contact gap on the 
rich–poor turnout gap. Studies show that voting is habit-forming over time 
and consistent engagement with nonvoters across elections can turn them 
into occasional or even frequent voters.239 A cycle could therefore emerge in 
which the continuous reach of campaigns into new communities of nonvoters 
continues to chip away at the turnout gap. 
Furthermore, every person that transitions from a nonvoter to a voter is 
a part of a social network. These new voters receive tailored information 
about the election and increase the number of politically active individuals 
in a network. Such new voters can enhance political communication within 
the network and embed in other members a sense of duty to vote, thereby 
improving turnout in previously politically marginalized communities. 
A virtuous cycle of political inclusion and concomitant reductions in 
the rich–poor turnout gap will not result from eliminating voter ID laws, 
prohibitions on voter purges, or making voting more convenient through 
early voting or Election Day holidays. Even automatic voter registration 
(which we discuss below) is no panacea. Voter registration is a serious 
barrier for many individuals, and the burden of registering to vote falls 
disproportionately on the poor. However, even among those who are 
registered to vote, turnout varies significantly by income. As illustrated in 
Figure 6, the gap in registration rates between the wealthiest quintile (earning 
approximately $70,000 or more per year) and the poorest quintile (earning 
approximately less than $20,000 per year) is 27%. Even among these 
individuals, who have exhibited the requisite interest in politics and effort to 
 
237 See Robert M. Bond et al., A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence and Political 
Mobilization, 487 NATURE 295, 297–98 (2012) (showing the indirect mobilization effect of online social 
pressure to vote between close friends through a randomized controlled trial of all Facebook users on the 
day of the 2010 congressional elections). 
238 See supra note 233. 
239 See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
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register to vote, we observe an income gap in voter turnout. The turnout gap 
between the wealthiest and poorest quintiles is 19%, which is much smaller 
than the gap in turnout as a percentage of the total voting age population but 
is still larger than the gap between White and Black voters (approximately 
15%). Thus, even automatic voter registration will likely not eliminate the 
rich–poor turnout gap. But we might be able to shrink this gap through efforts 
to combat campaigns’ passive voter suppression. In the next Part, we turn to 
the question of how to address passive voter suppression. We argue that 
doing so will require a fundamental shift in how election lawyers use law as 
a tool to address participatory inequality. 
FIGURE 6: VOTING AND REGISTRATION RATES BY INCOMEf 
f Rate of voter registration and voter turnout by equally sized income quintiles. Even among those who 
are registered to vote we observe a gap of nearly 20% in turnout between the highest and lowest quintiles. 
Source: Current Population Survey Voting and Registration Supplement, 2004–2016. 
IV. COMBATING PASSIVE VOTER SUPPRESSION 
There is no silver bullet to the problem of passive voter suppression. 
The conventional response to active forms of voter suppression used 
throughout American history, which involved the passage of prohibitory 
laws directed at state actors or judicial invalidations of suppressive laws as 
unconstitutional, is not suitable to combat passive voter suppression.240 
Political parties in their mobilization activities are not likely to be considered 
state actors for purposes of applying constitutional rights prohibitions.241 And 
 
240 See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4, 79 Stat. 437, 438–39 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10501 (2012)) (suspending and then ultimately banning literacy tests); Harper v. 
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 686 (1966) (declaring state poll taxes unconstitutional).  
241 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991) (“[T]he conduct of private 
parties lies beyond the Constitution’s scope in most instances [except when] governmental authority may 
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even if parties were considered state actors, constitutional freedom of speech 
and association prevent the state from forcing political parties to contact 
certain people or institutions as part of their mobilization campaigns.242 
Given this reality, we argue that combating passive voter suppression 
requires a multipronged strategy that deviates from the conventional legal 
responses to active voter suppression. Central to campaigns’ calculus of 
contact are two probability determinations and a budget constraint. First, 
campaigns assess the change in the probability that an individual will vote 
on the basis of the contact.243 Second, campaigns assess the change in the 
probability that an individual will vote favorably for the candidate as a result 
of the contact.244 Finally, campaigns must consider how many people they 
can contact given their budget constraint, which is set by the amount of 
contributions that campaigns receive from donors.245 
In this Part, we focus on how law could be used to manipulate the 
probability assessments in the calculus of contact. Similar to the calculus of 
voting, we argue that information is a key factor that can influence 
campaigns’ calculus of contact in a way that could lessen their bias against 
mobilizing the poor. 
Campaigns rely on two critical pieces of information in assessing the 
impact of contact on individuals’ likelihood of voting. First, campaigns rely 
on registration information.246 Individuals who are not registered are 
typically harder to mobilize to vote because they still have to overcome 
registration barriers in order to vote. Second, campaigns rely on information 
 
dominate an activity to such an extent that its participants must be deemed to act with the authority of the 
government . . . .”); see also Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A 
Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 777 (2000) (describing “[t]he crux of 
the problem political parties pose for lawyers and judges” as being whether parties are “state actors and 
therefore subject to constitutional restraints imposed by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment 
or . . . private associations . . . that can use the Constitution as a shield against state power”).  
242 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (“The forced inclusion of an unwanted 
person in a group infringes the group’s freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person 
affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.”); West Virginia 
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (declaring compelled speech to be a violation of 
the First Amendment freedom of speech).  
243 See Panagopoulos & Wielhouwer, supra note 214, at 350. 
244 See id. 
245 The size of a campaign’s budget is driven by some factors that are less subject to legal 
manipulation, such as the candidate’s wealth, public reputation, and embeddedness within networks of 
people with larger capacities to contribute to campaigns. But it is also driven by a factor that, in some 
cases, can be manipulated legally—the competitiveness of electoral jurisdiction. Holding all other factors 
constant, more competitive races draw more donations to campaigns from individuals and parties. ROLFE, 
supra note 161, at 99–100 (reviewing the literature finding that “in higher-stakes races, candidates and 
other actors will have more resources to spend on mobilizing the electorate, leading to higher rates of 
voter turnout”). 
246 See HERSH, supra note 216, at 29 (“Most strategic campaigns do not focus on transmitting 
appeals . . . to citizens not registered to vote.”).  
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about individuals’ voting history, specifically the elections in which the 
individual has voted in the recent past (information about how individuals 
voted is not publicly available in any state).247  Campaigns generally consider 
people with more scant voting histories to be harder (and therefore less cost-
effective) to mobilize than people with more robust voting histories.248 
Campaigns’ assessments about the change in the probability that an 
individual will vote favorably for the candidate as a result of contact is 
derived primarily from information about individuals’ partisan affiliations, 
but also from other evidence collected by data vendors.249 The choice of 
campaign strategy—base mobilization or voter persuasion—will dictate 
which individuals along the partisan spectrum campaigns will contact.250 But 
consistent with both strategies is campaigns’ reluctance to contact 
individuals for whom they have little to no information about partisan 
preferences.251 
Law cannot change how campaigns make these probability 
assessments, but it can change what information is available to campaigns to 
make these probability assessments. Below, we first describe the current 
information environment that states and data vendors have constructed for 
political campaigns, which we argue has contributed to the problem of 
passive voter suppression. To do this, we describe the results of our fifty-
state survey of state election laws to identify what information is available 
to campaigns to make the probability assessments that are central to the 
calculus of contact.252 
We then advance three alternative information environments that could 
change how campaigns apply the calculus of contact and identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of each alternative. The three alternative 
information environments we identify are: (1) a no-information 
environment; (2) a full-information environment; and (3) a partial-
information environment. As a preliminary matter, we conclude that a partial 
 
247 See id. at 147 (identifying vote history as critical data that campaigns use “to isolate segments of 
the electorate to whom they will direct their attention”); see also Access to and Use of Voter Registration 
Lists, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Aug. 5, 2019) http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/elections-and-campaigns/access-to-and-use-of-voter-registration-lists.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/JRZ9-QVNP] (summarizing each state’s laws on access to voter lists). 
248 See HERSH, supra note 216, at 146 (“In a general election campaign, [campaigns often] ignor[e] 
citizens who are not registered or have voted very infrequently in the past.”).  
249 See, e.g., Catalist One Percent Codebook (on file with authors) (showing the different sources of 
the Catalist data, the partisanship model, and partisanship scores for all persons in its database).  
250 See HERSH, supra note 216, at 142 (describing the campaign contacting patterns for the two 
mobilization strategies).  
251 See KLEIS NIELSEN, supra note 200, at 155–59 (identifying data on people’s partisan leanings as 
one of the most important pieces of information that campaign targeting consultants use in constructing 
a mobilization strategy). 
252 See infra Table 1.  
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information environment might be best to combat passive voter suppression, 
but we encourage future empirical work on the effect of different information 
environments on campaigns’ mobilization efforts. 
A. The Current Information Environment for Campaigns 
The administration of elections is primarily a state affair.253 States set 
voting qualifications, subject to limitations established in the Constitution, 
run elections, and collect and distribute voter information related to 
elections. States have historically delegated responsibilities for keeping and 
distributing voter information to localities.254 In the past, voter registration 
lists were the most important piece of information that local election officials 
kept. In 1993, however, the federal National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) 
provided states with financial incentives to better maintain their bloated voter 
registration rolls, which included individuals who had left the state, died, or 
otherwise became ineligible to vote.255 Then in 2002, Congress adopted the 
Help America Vote Act (HAVA) as a response to the failures in election 
administration during the 2000 presidential election.256 HAVA provided 
states with financial incentives to create a computerized statewide voter 
registration list.257 
In just over a decade, voter registration list maintenance was transferred 
from over 13,000 counties, cities, and towns to fifty states and the District of 
Columbia.258 The newly centralized voter registration lists were a boon for 
campaigns seeking to engage in mobilization activities.259 Rather than 
needing to cobble together registration lists from multiple localities 
throughout a district or state, campaigns could engage in one-stop shopping 
at the state level. In the 2008 presidential election campaign, President 
Obama took advantage of the centralized voter registration lists to put 
 
253 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
254 See HERSH, supra note 216, at 62–63 (describing how towns and counties controlled registration 
prior to the National Voter Registration Act and the Help America Vote Act).  
255 National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. § 20507 (2012); see also HERSH, supra note 216, at 
63 (describing the background and intent underlying the NVRA).  
256 Rabia Belt, Contemporary Voting Rights Controversies Through the Lens of Disability, 68 STAN. 
L. REV. 1491, 1503 (2016).  
257 Help America Vote Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 21083, 21041 (2012); see also SASHA ISSENBERG, THE 
VICTORY LAB: THE SECRET SCIENCE OF WINNING CAMPAIGNS 245 (2012) (describing how HAVA 
“encouraged states to centralize their electoral data and organize their voter files in standard formats that 
for the first time made it easy to manipulate records across state lines”). 
258 See NAT’L COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE 
ELECTORAL PROCESS 29 (Jimmy Carter et al. eds., 2002) (describing the pre-HAVA registration system 
where registration data was “usually recorded and maintained in the separate files of the nearly 13,000 
local election jurisdictions of the United States”). 
259 ISSENBERG, supra note 257, at 245. 
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together the most comprehensive and sophisticated mobilization operation 
in history.260 
Registration lists contain information about voters that is critical to 
campaigns. First, the lists themselves only include the names and addresses 
of individuals who are registered to vote in the state.261 Campaigns can 
therefore easily avoid unregistered persons. Second, at least 35 states make 
information about individuals’ voting histories available to parties and 
candidates (see Table 1 below). Some states provide specific information 
about the elections in which individuals have voted in the past. Other states 
distribute lists of inactive voters to candidates and parties (lists of individuals 
who have either moved, not voted in elections over the past two years, or 
both) that the NVRA requires states to keep and maintain. 
In 34 states, registration lists available to candidates and campaigns 
include information about individuals’ partisan affiliation or party 
preferences. In the 36 states with primaries limited to persons with a 
particular partisan affiliation or nonaffiliation, the collection about 
individuals’ partisan affiliations, and its distribution to parties, is necessary 
for the operation of the primary system.262 
Given the high percentage of voters that identify as independents in the 
United States (39% as of January 2019),263 the more well-funded campaigns 
purchase information about individuals’ partisan tendencies from private 
data vendors to assess the probability that individuals will vote favorably for 
the candidate as a result of contact. For example, Catalist, a private data 
vendor that the Obama campaign purchased information from, assigns 
partisan scores to individuals on the basis of information about individuals’ 
characteristics and behaviors collected from sources such as the United 
States Census, the Federal Reserve, public records, media outlets, and 
infoUSA.264 Most campaigns cannot afford the cost of information from data 
 
260 See, e.g., Sasha Issenberg, How Obama’s Team Used Big Data to Rally Voters, MIT TECH. REV. 
(Dec. 19, 2012), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/509026/how-obamas-team-used-big-data-to-
rally-voters [https://perma.cc/5TJE-L7MS] (describing how the Obama campaign used publicly available 
data and data vendors to fuel its mobilization operation).  
261 The Alaska state law on the preparation of registration lists is a typical state registration law in 
that it includes “the names and addresses of all persons whose names appear on the master register.” 
ALASKA STAT. § 15.07.127 (2018).  
262 See State Primary Election Types, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 26, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/primary-types [https://perma.cc/AR53-SDZF] 
(describing the state primary election types in the various states).  
263 Party Affiliation, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/15370/paMinnesotarty-affiliation.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/HJ4B-4GAJ] (reporting trends monthly since 2004 in answering, “[i]n politics, as of 
today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat or an Independent?”).  
264 See Catalist One Percent Codebook, supra note 249. 
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vendors and therefore rely on the cheaper and sometimes free state sources 
of information.265 
In Table 1, we present a taxonomy of state voter information 
distribution regimes focusing on the two pieces of information critical to the 
calculus of contact—voting history and partisan affiliation. More than half 
of the states distribute both individuals’ voter history information in some 
form and individuals’ partisan affiliation, providing campaigns with access 
to the information critical to making the necessary probability assessments 
in the calculus of contact. This information environment has likely helped 
produce the large rich–poor disparities in contact over the past three 
presidential elections that we associate with passive voter suppression. What 
are possible alternative information environments and how might they 
impact passive voter suppression? In the next Section, we identify those 
alternatives and offer tentative predictions about likely changes to passive 
voter suppressions in each of the information environments. 
  
 
265 See Nickerson & Rogers, supra note 221, at 66 (“[S]maller campaigns will benefit most from 
targeting based on predictive scores, but they are also the campaigns that are least able to afford hiring 
campaign data analysts and voter databases.”). 
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TABLE 1: FIFTY STATE SURVEY OF VOTER INFORMATION DISCLOSUREg 
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g Taxonomy of states by disclosure of voter history and voter partisanship to political campaigns and the 
public. Source: Authors’ coding of state statutes, as of 2019. 
B. Alternative Information Environments to Combat Voter Suppression 
1. The No-Information Environment 
One alternative information environment is one in which states deny to 
parties and campaigns the voter information critical to the calculus of 
voting—registration status, voter history, and partisan affiliation. States in 
this no-information environment would not only deny this information to 
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parties and campaigns but also to the public and the data vendors who could 
distribute or sell the information to campaigns. 
No states currently deny campaigns all three pieces of information. The 
eight states that deny information about individuals’ voting history and 
partisan affiliation to parties still provide them with registration lists that 
identify the registration status of persons within the state. The one state, 
North Dakota, that does not keep registration lists because it does not require 
registration in order to vote, still provides parties and campaigns with voter 
lists, which identify individuals who have voted in past elections and 
includes four years of their voting history.266 To the extent that a substantial 
portion of the electorate is concerned about electoral integrity and 
registration systems are seen as important vehicles for preserving such 
integrity, registration requirements are not going anywhere.267 But just 
because a state maintains a registration system does not mean that it has to 
make registration lists and accompanying information about individuals’ 
voting history and partisan affiliation accessible to parties. 
Denying this information to campaigns could reduce passive voter 
suppression through the complete disruption of the calculus of contact. 
Without this voter information, it would be much harder for campaigns to 
make either of the probability assessments that guide their decisions about 
whom to contact. And through this disruption, campaigns’ contact patterns 
might become less biased against the poor. 
There are, however, two problems with this response to passive voter 
suppression. First, campaigns would not be completely in the dark about 
individuals’ voter behavior and partisan preferences. Aggregate voting 
information would continue to be collected at the precinct level and broadly 
available to the public as a part of the public vote counting exercise that is a 
part of every election. From the precinct data, campaigns can identify 
differences in turnout levels and partisan voting patterns and make decisions 
about which neighborhoods to canvass.268 Campaigns would likely use this 
precinct-level data from prior elections to inform their much cruder 
probability assessments. 
 
266 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-02-12 (2019) (identifying the information contained and maintained 
in the central voter file); id. § 16.1-02-15 (making available voter lists and reports for election-related 
purposes).  
267 See, e.g., Dayna L. Cunningham, Who Are to Be Electors? A Reflection on the History of Voter 
Registration in the United States, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 370, 373 (1991) (identifying fraud prevention 
as the principal justification for registration systems in the modern context). 
268 See, e.g., Harvard Election Data Archive, HARV. DATAVERSE, 
https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/eda/data [https://perma.cc/EZ7J-MMFP] (collecting precinct-level voting 
data and linking it to geographic boundary files). 
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The loss of information would thus reduce campaigns’ capacity to 
microtarget individuals for contact, but rational campaigns will still target 
particular neighborhoods with greater numbers of voters and, depending on 
the mobilization strategy, with particular partisan compositions.269 The 
neighborhood-level mobilization targeting caused by the loss of information 
would be less efficient for campaigns and would likely lead to some 
improvement in socioeconomic equity in campaign contact. But given the 
degree of socioeconomic segregation in the United States and the correlation 
between income, educational attainment, and voting, campaigns would 
likely avoid entire low-income neighborhoods.270 Alternatively, campaigns 
may look for proxies that predict income relatively well and are easy (i.e., 
less costly) to observe. One such proxy may be race. Similar to “ban the box” 
policies that prohibit employers from asking about applicants’ criminal 
histories on job applications (but have resulted in fewer callbacks for black 
job applicants), the attempt to help a disadvantaged group may backfire by 
driving campaigns to less reliable signals and stereotypes.271 
Second, a no-information environment may not be possible. Data 
vendors would still collect other publicly available information and use it to 
make predictions about partisan preferences. More importantly, the closed 
and semi-closed primary systems that exist in many states require the 
distribution of information about registered voters’ partisan affiliation so that 
the parties can properly run their primaries. Parties in these states will 
therefore acquire access to information about individuals’ partisan 
preferences and their voter registration statuses. These two bits of 
information would create opportunities for campaigns to more precisely 
target individuals for contact using the calculus of contact. 
2. The Full-Information Environment 
On the other extreme is a full-information environment. A full-
information environment would be one in which states collected information 
about all eligible voters’ registration status, voter history, and partisan 
affiliation and make this information accessible to parties and campaigns. As 
seen in Table 1, seventeen states and the District of Columbia currently 
collect and share information about registered persons’ voting history and 
 
269 See HERSH, supra note 216, at 57 (“A chief alternative to individual-level targeting based on 
registration records was, and still is, geographic-level targeting based on past election returns.”). 
270 See, e.g., Sean F. Reardon & Kendra Bischoff, Income Inequality and Income Segregation, 
116 AM. J. SOC. 1092, 1115–25 (2011) (describing the trends in residential income segregation since 
1970); see also supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
271 See, e.g., Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Racial 
Discrimination: A Field Experiment, 133 Q. J. ECON. 191 (2017) (finding that the Black–White gap in 
callbacks for hypothetical candidates for job interviews increased when employers were unable to ask 
about the criminal history). 
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partisan affiliation. Another eight states maintain and share active and 
inactive voter lists that provide some information about registered persons’ 
voting history and their partisan affiliation. 
Although these states provide more information about individuals than 
any other, they still come up short in providing full information about 
persons eligible to vote within their jurisdictions. States generally do not 
collect or share any information about unregistered persons. In fact, every 
state except Massachusetts collects and shares only information about 
registered voters.272 Parties and campaigns that rely on information from the 
state therefore do not know who unregistered persons are, where they live, 
what their voting history is (for those who may have been registered and 
voted in another state), or what their partisan affiliation is. 
A completely full-information environment is probably unrealistic 
given that not even the relatively well-funded United States Census is able 
to collect information about everyone in the country.273 But there are two 
potential pathways to a fuller information environment. The first is to follow 
the example of Massachusetts. In addition to collecting information about 
registered voters, towns in Massachusetts prepare and maintain “street lists,” 
making it the only state that provides parties and campaigns with information 
about unregistered persons.274 These street lists include the identity, address, 
date of birth, occupation, and nationality of all persons in the state who are 
seventeen years of age and older and an asterisk next to the name of persons 
who are registered to vote.275 But these street lists do not include information 
about voting history, and partisan affiliation is not consistently included.276 
States could replicate Massachusetts’s “street list” approach and add survey 
questions about individuals’ voting histories and partisan affiliations, then 
share all of the resulting data with parties. 
A fuller information environment might reduce the rich–poor contact 
gap because campaigns with information about the partisan preferences of 
unregistered persons might be more inclined to contact them. But campaigns 
 
272 See infra note 274 and accompanying text.  
273 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY: RESPONSE RATES, 
https://www.census.gov/acs/www/methodology/sample-size-and-data-quality/response-rates 
[https://perma.cc/SYT7-R73C] (identifying a response rate ranging from 90% to 98% depending on the 
year from 2000 to 2017).  
274 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 51, § 4. 
275 Id.  
276 Towns in Massachusetts annually compile street lists by mailing forms that include all the 
information about voter eligible persons in the household to all addresses in the town. Adults in the 
household are required to return the forms to the town clerk, and if they fail to do so, they are designated 
as inactive voters on the street list. See, e.g., Question and Answers About the Annual Street List Form, 
TOWN OF WALES, https://www.townofwales.net/sites/walesma/files/uploads/faqs_about_the_annual_ 
street_list_form.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9P5-CXM7]. 
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might still be reluctant to contact these individuals because they are 
unregistered and presumably lack much of a voting history. It is difficult to 
know how much the addition of partisan preference information on 
unregistered persons would change the campaigns’ contact calculus, but it is 
likely that a different approach which provides fuller information about 
potential voters would have some effect on reducing the contact gap. 
In this second pathway, states obtain fuller information about eligible 
voters through an automatic voter registration (AVR) system. In 2015, 
Oregon became the first state to adopt AVR.277 Eleven more states adopted 
AVR between 2016 and 2018 and at least twenty-four other states are 
expected to adopt AVR in 2019.278 The AVR systems are enhancements on 
the federal National Voter Registration Act’s (NVRA) method for 
registering voters. The NVRA conditioned federal funding to states on the 
adoption of a voter registration system that would allow individuals to 
register to vote when they apply for a driver’s license at a state motor vehicle 
agency or for public assistance at a state public assistance agency.279 
The NVRA made voter registration more broadly accessible, but 
because it operated according to an opt-in model, in which persons would 
need to come into contact with one of the state agencies and would need to 
decide to register to vote, many remained unregistered. The opt-in NVRA 
model has produced only minor gains in the percentage of persons who 
report being registered to vote. According to the United States Census 
Bureau Voting and Registration Supplement, 68.2% of U.S. citizens aged 18 
years and older reported being registered to vote in 1992, the last presidential 
election year before the adoption of the NVRA.280 In the most recent 
presidential election in 2016, 70.3% of citizens aged 18 years and older 
reported being registered to vote.281 
In contrast to the NVRA, AVR systems employ an opt-out voter 
registration model. In the AVR opt-out registration model, a person who 
comes into contact with agencies designated by the state are conditionally 
 
277 History of AVR & Implementation Dates, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (June 19, 2019), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/history-avr-implementation-dates [https://perma.cc/49FF-6PFR] 
(reporting that the state has seen registration rates quadruple since the implementation of AVR).  
278 Automatic Voter Registration Bills, 2015–Present, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (July 10, 2019) 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/automatic-voter-registration-bills-2015-present 
[https://perma.cc/BNM4-VYN6] (listing all AVR bills introduced by states since 2015). 
279 52 U.S.C. § 20503 (2012); id. § 20506.  
280 JERRY T. JENNINGS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, P20-466, VOTING 
AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 1992, at vi tbl.B (1993). 
281 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2016: 
TABLE 4C (2017), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-
580.html [https://perma.cc/J732-VA78].  
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registered to vote.282 In one model (e.g., California), the conditionally 
registered voters are given the chance to opt out while at the agency or, if 
they do not opt out, are given an opportunity to declare their partisan 
affiliation. In another model (e.g., Oregon), conditionally registered voters 
are sent a registration notification card in the mail in which they can opt to 
decline to be registered or can choose their party affiliation.283 Conditionally 
registered voters who take no action are registered as unaffiliated voters.284 
Proponents argue that by shifting the default to being registered, it will 
increase the number of persons registered to vote.285 It is too early to tell, but 
the proponents’ arguments are consistent with findings from behavioral 
economics that opt-out regimes secure more participation than opt-in 
regimes.286 
From the perspective of creating a full-information environment that 
can combat passive voter suppression, more registered voters as a result of 
AVR means more complete registration lists with accompanying voting 
history and partisan affiliation. In this fuller information environment, 
campaigns should have stronger incentives to contact registered persons that 
would have remained unregistered under the NVRA’s opt-in approach. But 
there are two factors that might reduce the effect of the full-information 
environment on passive voter suppression. First, campaigns will likely still 
rely on information about individuals’ voting histories in deciding who to 
contact. That will play to the disadvantage of lower income voters who tend 
to have a less substantial voting history. 
Second, many people might not return the voting registration card in 
the opt-out regime. The decision to not return the voter registration card will, 
of course, mean that the person becomes a permanently registered voter by 
default. But it will also mean that the person assumes an unaffiliated voter 
status. The AVR opt-out regime is therefore likely to increase the number of 
unaffiliated voters. Worse yet, the AVR opt-out regime might actually 
increase campaign’s uncertainty regarding unaffiliated individuals’ partisan 
preferences.287 
 
282 See, e.g., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE CASE FOR AUTOMATIC VOTER REGISTRATION  
6–7 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Case_for_Automatic_Voter_ 
Registration.pdf [https://perma.cc/89C6-UGG2] (describing how automatic voter registration works). 
283 Automatic Voter Registration, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 22, 2019), http://www.ncsl. 
org/research/elections-and-campaigns/automatic-voter-registration.aspx [https://perma.cc/57LA-MJJ2]. 
284 Id.  
285 Id. 
286 See, e.g., Brigitte C. Madrian, Applying Insights from Behavioral Economics to Policy Design, 
6 ANN. REV. ECON. 663, 668 (2014) (describing the increased participation rates associated with opt-out 
automatic enrollment in retirement savings plans). 
287 Kevin Morris & Peter Dunphy, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, AVR Impact on State Voter Registration, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 4 (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-
114:633 (2019) Passive Voter Supression 
699 
In an opt-in regime, registered voters consciously choose to be 
unaffiliated, which is an indication that the registered voter does not strongly 
support either party. But in an opt-out regime, where unaffiliated status is the 
default, the campaign has no way of knowing whether the registered voter is 
unaffiliated because she does not strongly support either party or simply 
because she failed to send the notification card back. The latter type of 
unaffiliated registered voter might clearly support one party or the other, but 
the campaign would have no way of knowing. The increased uncertainty 
about the meaning of unaffiliated voter status might lead campaigns to 
increasingly employ mobilization strategies that target declared party 
affiliates. To the extent AVR results in registered poor voters being 
disproportionately unaffiliated with either party, campaigns might continue 
to bias their mobilization activities away from the poor. 
States could get around this problem by being more proactive in seeking 
out the partisan affiliation status of voters. For example, states could follow 
the lead of Michigan, which authorizes township, city, and village clerks to 
“conduct . . . house-to-house canvass[es] or use such other means of 
checking the correctness of registration records as may seem expedient.”288 
But such a process would be expensive. Alternatively, states could subsidize 
campaigns’ purchase of information from private voter data vendors and 
campaigns could use data vendors’ partisan propensity scores to assess the 
meaning of unaffiliated status in a way that will inform their calculus of 
contact. That would also be costly but, depending on the number of 
campaigns, it will likely be less costly than house-to-house canvassing and 
would likely yield better information than a partisan affiliation survey. 
3. The Partial-Information Environment 
A third option is for states to increase the amount of information 
campaigns can access along dimensions likely to reduce socioeconomic bias 
in contact, while decreasing the amount of information along dimensions 
likely to expand socioeconomic bias in contact. The categories into which 
each of the three critical pieces of information—registration status, voting 
history, and partisan preferences—fall into cannot be determined with any 
degree of certainty without empirical testing that is beyond the scope of this 
Article. But three viable hypotheses can be derived from the calculus of 
contact itself. 
First, the effect of information about registration status on campaigns’ 
mobilization patterns will be contingent on the percentage of the population 
 
08/Report_AVR_Impact_State_Voter_Registration.pdf [https://perma.cc/37NZ-S7RP] (“[C]lose to 85 
percent of new voters registered through AVR were automatically marked as nonaffiliated . . . .”). 
 288 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.515 (1954). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
700 
that is registered to vote. In states where nearly all people are registered to 
vote, as may come to pass in states that implement AVR, information about 
registration status will likely decrease the socioeconomic contact gap for the 
reasons described above. In states where only a substantial majority of the 
people are registered to vote, as is the case in most states today, information 
about registration status is probably an important source of the 
socioeconomic contact gap. Given that states are unlikely to abandon 
registration systems anytime soon and parties and campaigns will continue 
to have access to registration lists, particularly in states that have closed or 
semi-closed primaries, the best path forward to reducing the socioeconomic 
contact gap is to push for AVR alongside the continued distribution of 
registration information. 
Our second hypothesis is that information about voting history tends to 
expand socioeconomic bias in contact. Campaigns tend to contact people 
with higher propensities to vote based on their voting history and the poor 
tend to have a less substantial voting history. In states where voting history 
is available, it is easier for campaigns to avoid low propensity voters than in 
states where voting history is not. Therefore, if the goal is to reduce 
socioeconomic bias in contact, states could deny campaigns access to voting 
history information. 
Unlike voter registration and partisan identification information that is 
needed for parties to properly run a closed or semi-closed primary, there is 
no obvious systemic reason for campaigns to have access to voter history 
information. States might need to collect such information as part of their 
efforts to maintain cleaner voter rolls that exclude persons who have moved 
out of the state, died, or otherwise become ineligible to vote.289 But there is 
no evident reason why this information needs to be shared with campaigns. 
There might, however, be voter turnout costs associated with denying 
to the public access to individuals’ voting history that are important to 
recognize. In an influential experimental study, Professors Alan Gerber, 
Donald Green, and Christopher Larimer found that social pressure in the 
form of a mailer listing the recent voting record of people in the household 
and the recent voting records of those living nearby had a substantial turnout 
effect.290 While the control group that did not receive any mailer had a turnout 
rate of 29.7%, the treatment group that received a mailer listing the voting 
record of people in the household and their neighbors voted at a 37.8% clip.291 
 
289 See 52 U.S.C. § 20507 (2012) (establishing federal requirements for the administration of voting 
rolls).  
290 Alan S. Gerber et al., Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field 
Experiment, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 33, 34 (2008). 
291 Id. at 38.  
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This represented “a remarkable 8.1 percentage-point treatment effect” that 
far exceeded the small treatment effect of political mailers on turnout in other 
experiments.292 
If the state denied public access to voter history information, any 
turnout gains arising from social pressure through the use of such 
information would be lost. But any turnout gains from such social pressure 
are likely to only exacerbate the socioeconomic turnout gap as the poor are 
less likely to be in social networks where they will receive pressure to vote.293 
It may be better to sacrifice some turnout gains from the use of voting history 
for more equitable campaign contact and turnout that may result from 
making such information publicly inaccessible. 
Our third hypothesis is that the effect of information about partisan 
identification on the socioeconomic contact gap is likely to be contingent on 
the presumed validity of the information. For reasons having to do with the 
nature of primary systems in states that we describe above, we could not 
completely deny to campaigns access to registered persons’ partisan 
identification information. But we may want to make information about 
individuals’ partisan preferences more, not less, available. To the extent that 
campaigns have more information about the partisan preferences of the poor, 
the calculus of contact suggests that campaigns will often have greater 
incentives to contact the poor because they will be able to better assess the 
probability that the person contacted will vote favorably for the candidate. 
The key is providing reliable information about the poor’s partisan 
preferences. And this can be done through the combination of AVR and 
active outreach by states to individuals to seek out their partisan preferences, 
or via campaigns’ acquisition of vendor data about the probable partisan 
leaning of individuals, which the state could subsidize. 
 
292 Id.; see also Gerber & Green, The Effects of Canvassing, supra note 21, at 660 (finding through 
an experiment that “direct mail raises turnout by .6 percentage points for each mailing”).  
The findings from this study informed the development of two new political apps, VoteWithMe and 
OutVote, in time for the 2018 midterm elections. About, VOTEWITHME, https://votewithme.us/ 
about.html [https://perma.cc/S2ZF-KWK7]; Organizing for Everyone, OUTVOTE, https://www.outvote.io 
[https://perma.cc/KX2X-RDHY].  
The apps match people’s smartphone contacts with state voter files and then display information about 
their contacts’ voting history. Natasha Singer, Did You Vote? Now Your Friends May Know (and Nag 
You), N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2D0Xq81 [https://perma.cc/47H4-C46T]. The app then 
produces an automated message that the owner of the app can send to encourage their contact to vote in 
the election. Id.  
The motivating force behind the app is social pressure as contacted persons who receive messages 
through the app know that their friends know their past voting history and will know whether they voted 
in the election in which they are being nudged to vote. It is not yet clear whether such social pressure 
through the app will work to increase the turnout of the nudge recipients, but the findings from the Gerber 
et al. study suggests that it might. See Gerber et al., supra note 290, at 38. 
293 See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
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In sum, a partial-information environment that could effectively reduce 
the socioeconomic bias in contact would include fuller registration through 
AVR, no publicly accessible information about individuals’ voting history, 
and more accessible and reliable information about individuals’ partisan 
preferences. That partial-information environment does have some 
drawbacks and may not be easy to implement. Ultimately, further empirical 
testing is necessary to assess which, if any, of the information environments 
reduces passive suppression, but the partial-information environment might 
be the best of the three. 
CONCLUSION 
We may never return to the Jim Crow Era of complete 
disenfranchisement of an entire community of eligible voters, but the active 
voter suppression threat remains real. In fact, the coming years will likely 
see more efforts to actively suppress the vote. Voter ID laws will probably 
be enacted in more states, voter roll purges could emerge as a common 
election year practice, early voting might continue to be reduced or 
eliminated altogether, and registration rules may be tightened further. These 
new voter suppression tools could further enhance partisan advantage and 
give candidates victories that they would not have had in the absence of these 
laws. To ensure the fairness of elections and the opportunity for everyone to 
vote, voting rights advocates should continue their fights against these laws 
and in favor of laws that make voting easier. 
But if the goal is an inclusive democracy, then voting rights advocates 
will need to target something more than the new voter suppression. State 
decisions to increase barriers to voting are not the primary source of the large 
disparities in participation between different classes of voters, disparities that 
not only exist between the rich and the poor but also between the old and 
young and Latinos and other racial and ethnic groups. Removing all tangible 
cost barriers to voting will not lead to participatory equality between these 
groups. 
To achieve the goal of an inclusive democracy, we also need to look at 
campaign mobilization practices. Through their door-to-door canvasses, 
calls, and mailers to potential voters, campaigns reduce the most important 
cost barriers to voting: the cost of the information necessary to give people 
a reason to vote. Through these contacts, campaigns also increase 
individuals’ sense of duty to vote, a critical intangible benefit from voting. 
But campaigns focused on winning elections contact some and ignore others 
in ways that are biased along class lines. This uneven distribution of contacts, 
which we label passive voter suppression, has undercut the goal of 
democratic inclusion. 
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Voting rights advocates therefore need to develop strategies to combat 
passive voter suppression. We offer one here that focuses on changing the 
amount and type of information about potential voters that is available to 
campaigns. An information environment that provides campaigns with 
information about all voters’ partisan orientations (through automatic voter 
registration) and denies to campaigns information about individuals’ voting 
histories may have the strongest effect on reducing passive voter 
suppression. But this legal intervention represents only a first step that will 
need to be followed up with other legal responses designed to increase the 
incentives for campaigns to reach out to the politically marginalized. 
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